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1Executive Summary 
Diverse Healthcare Providers: Behaviour in response to commissioners,
patients and innovations
BACKGROUND
UK health policy includes replacing public providers of NHS-funded services with a mix of 
providers under more diverse ownership - corporate, voluntary, ‘not-for-profit’, professional 
partnerships, NHS foundation trusts and social enterprises. 
STUDY AIMS
This research aimed to contribute to filling the gap in evidence as to what effects provider 
diversification is likely to have on patient experience, innovation in healthcare, and the 
implementation of other health policies, e.g. cost reduction and service ‘integration’. 
METHODS 
We systematically compared case studies of differently-owned providers of hospital orthopaedics, 
hospital ophthalmology, community health services, and out-of-hours services in terms of their 
structure, management, innovations and ‘market’ environments, responsiveness to commissioners, 
and patient experiences and choice. During 2015-17 we interviewed 83 managers and 89 patients 
across 12 organisations (3 corporate, 3 NHS trust, 2 not-for-profit, 2 social enterprise, 1 co-
operative, 1 partnership) across England. We observed 15 meetings and, to assess how typical of 
their kind our case-study organisations were, analysed HES (2013-14) and OPCS (2011) data. We 
used Donabedian’s analysis of organisations as a framework to combine the data. 
2FINDINGS
The Diverse Provider Landscape 
Non-NHS providers’ share of NHS spending grew consistently over the last five years to £10 billion
(9% of NHS spending) in 2013-4. Considerable ‘churn’ occurred among non-NHS providers, with 
two main elements: 
1. Unstable volumes and case-mix of their NHS-funded workloads. 
2. Constant entries, exits, mergers, acquisitions and re-acquisitions, in contrast to the stability 
of NHS trusts. 
The non-NHS supply side tended to converge upon having larger, fewer, more predominantly 
corporate and financialised structures. Paradoxically, concentration of ownership occurred 
alongside de-concentration of local hospital care, with more non-NHS hospitals becoming available
to NHS-funded patients. 
Local quasi-market environments 
Recent and current NHS budget restrictions tended to make innovation patterns converge across 
differently-owned providers (including NHS providers) and limit ownership diversity, especially the
growth of corporate provision. Safety, quality and reporting standards were largely the same across 
diversely-owned providers and tended to produce convergent behaviour, but not all standards (e.g. 
Safe Staffing) applied uniformly to providers under different ownership. 
The scale and composition of care groups for treatment-centre, out-of-hours and community health 
services tended to produce convergent behaviour among providers irrespective of ownership, but 
service development differed in character between NHS trusts and other hospitals. Providers which 
relied on both privately- and NHS-funded patients wanted to preserve their income from, hence 
differentiate, their services for privately-funded patients. 
Organisational Structures
Different ownership produced divergent organisational structures at the highest level. Yet 
differently-owned providers had similar coordination structures at workplace (hospital, clinic, care-
team or call-centre) level. In the organisations owned by doctors, doctors organised themselves 
3democratically and managed the non-doctors were managed through a medically-controlled 
hierarchy. In a few of the other organisations doctors were sub-contractors or had admitting rights 
but most commonly, and always for non-medical staff, bureaucratic hierarchies were used for 
everyday work coordination. 
Innovation 
National and regional mandates tended to make work processes (service location, professional 
demarcations) and innovations converge in our sample of organisations. Staff availability permitting
- which it often did not - the two large corporations (but not the small one), the voluntary and one 
social enterprise in our sample paid non-medical staff less than NHS trusts did. Irrespective of 
ownership all providers paid under block contract made demand-containment innovations such as 
clinical hubs or strengthening multi-professional teams outside hospital. Non-NHS hospitals 
selected services which, coincidentally, could be provided on a small scale, in calm and often more 
modern settings. Corporate and NFP providers selected innovations by ‘business case’, i.e. expected
profitability. Subject to that, corporate providers had quicker, easier access to capital than voluntary 
providers and cooperatives, and the latter had readier access to capital than the NHS trusts, social 
enterprises and professional partnerships did. The study period was too short to expose the long-
term implications. Treating also privately-funded patients, the NFP chain hospitals were willing to 
market procedures of limited clinical value. 
Responsiveness to commissioners
Gradually all providers came to respond to commissioners in more ‘relational’ ways (frequent 
informal contact, negotiation and collaboration) although this took time to develop, periods of 
formal tendering sometimes interrupted it, and the providers’ starting point was often an unflattering
view of CCG and CSU commissioning capacity, methods and demands for information. Providers’ 
bargaining power depended on their ‘market’ share and how many commissioners they dealt with 
rather than their ownership. Corporate and voluntary providers were usually willing to take on 
additional work provided they were paid for it and it was profitable. They withdrew from, or never 
started, providing NHS commissioners with services whose reduced tariff no longer met their costs 
and (where applicable) profits. In the past NHS trusts had been more accommodating in absorbing 
workload increases within their existing contracts but fiscal pressures on them were reducing that 
flexibility. Local knowledge and networks were of practical advantage to providers in 
4understanding and responding relationally to commissioners’ suggestions for local health system 
changes and developments, and that tended to favour existing providers. 
Patients’ experience 
Competitive tendering did not usually give patients a choice of community health and our-of-hours 
services because commissioners usually commissioned a single provider, whether or not NHS-
owned. Where patient choice did apply, it was constrained by what services the non-NHS providers 
wanted to offer, and NHS triage and referral management systems. Many patients chose not to 
choose; they preferred to rely on their GP’s advice. Others did choose. Many of them preferred 
NHS providers. Choice of provider and diverse provision were not the same thing. 
Once patients had chosen a provider, or had it chosen for them, there were few differences in the 
range of choices of treatment, practitioner, place of treatment, time of treatment or of discharge 
between diversely-owned providers. 
In contrast, patient experience of secondary care especially did differ between providers. Patients 
described a different ambience in the corporate and not-for-profit hospitals than in NHS acute 
hospitals. They reported the same calmer ambience in community hospitals, whether NHS-owned 
or not. The difference depended upon whether emergency and unplanned urgent care took place 
alongside planned care, or planned care was provided on a separate site. Patient voice, through 
consultative mechanisms, played a minor role in the case-study sites, irrespective of ownership. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We found few differences in management structures at workplace level, or in care processes, 
between the diversely owned providers. The most evident differences arising from ownership were 
the differentiation of services for private patients, pay policy, and high-level organisational 
structure. Differences in NHS-funded patients’ experience reflected provider case-mix rather than 
ownership. This evidence suggests that any policy rationales for diverse provision rest upon a 
different basis that innovation, patient experience or responsiveness to commissioners. It calls into 
question whether, in times of austerity, it is worth the NHS spending the additional money that 
would be required to induce independent, especially corporate, providers to enter the quasi-market. 
5Abstract 
Background 
NHS-funded services are provided by diversely-owned organisations: corporate, ‘not-for-profit’, 
proprietary, cooperative, professional partnerships, NHS trusts, social enterprises. 
Objectives 
To examine effects of diverse provider ownership on patient experience, innovation and health 
policy implementation (e.g. cost reduction, service ‘integration’). 
Design
Realist mixed methods. Systematic comparison of hospital orthopaedics, hospital ophthalmic, 
community health and out-of-hours services sampled for maximum variation by ownership. 
Qualitative study of patient experience. Routine analysis of administrative data to assess 
generalisability of findings. Synthesis of findings by framework analysis. 
Data Sources
Interviews of 83 managers and 89 patients across 12 organisations (3 corporate, 3 NHS trust, 2 not-
for-profit, 2 social enterprise, 1 co-operative, 1 partnership). Meeting observation (N=15). Data 
collected in England, 2015-17. HES (2013-14) and OPCS (2011) administrative data. 
Results 
Non-NHS providers were tending to become more often corporate and financialised. Regulations 
and quality standards encouraged convergent behaviour among differently-owned providers. 
Differently-owned providers had divergent top-level organisational structures but similar 
coordination structures at workplace level. Innovation was largely policy led. Technical innovation 
tended to emerge from NHS trusts, service delivery innovations from providers of all ownerships. 
6Providers with private patients differentiated services for them from services for NHS patients. 
Patients found the ambience of secondary care in non-NHS providers – and in CHS services, 
irrespective of ownership – very different to that in NHS acute trusts. The difference reflected case-
mix not ownership. 
Limitations 
Some combinations of provider ownership and service delivery were not found in the English NHS.
No routine data on patient outcomes were analysed. Study period was too short to expose long-term
consequences of different innovation and investment patterns across differently-owned providers. 
Conclusions
Service and organisational differences across differently-owned providers appear smaller than 
public debates often suppose, calling partly into question the policy rationales for diverse provision.
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Chapter 1.  Study Aims and Research Questions 
1.a.  Research Aims  
UK health policy aims to replace exclusively public providers of NHS-funded services with a mix 
of providers under more diverse forms of ownership1 - corporate, voluntary, ‘not-for-profit’ and so 
on. This research aimed to examine what effects provider diversification is likely to have on patient 
experience, innovation in healthcare and the implementation of other current health policies, for 
example cost reduction and service ‘integration’. A more nuanced question is whether diversely-
owned providers will diverge in some of these respects and converge in others. 
1.b.  Research Questions  
Our study therefore addresses the following research questions. 
How do differently-owned providers of NHS-funded services vary in their responses to: 
1. Innovation: 
(a) Responses to potential innovations, speed of response and ensuing service changes? 
(b) Use of freedom to innovate (in particular, for NHS Foundation Trusts)? 
2. NHS commissioning changes. Specifically, what: 
(a) Role do different providers play in service design? 
(b) Do provider-commissioner interactions focus upon (clinical outcomes, transactions and 
procurement, other matters)? 
(c) Responses do local commissioners’ requirements (e.g. accommodating changed referral 
patterns, collaboration with local authorities, targeting deprived populations) produce? 
(d) Responses do national policy requirements (e.g. the Fair Playing Field Review, or for 
productivity, impacts on outcomes, public involvement, transparency of provider 
activity) produce? 
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(e) Differences are there between differently owned providers in terms of transparent to 
commissioners and the use of information for commissioning purposes? 
3. Patient 
(a) Choice, including patients' rights to choose their healthcare provider? 
(b) Experience of services 
We also ask: 
4. What implications for commissioning and managerial practice follow from the above, 
enabling the NHS to make better use of provider diversity? 
(We have revised the sequence, but not the content, of these questions from the research protocol to 
match the more logical sequence in Chapters 2-3 below.) 
The different ownership types that we consider are corporate, not-for-profit (including voluntary), 
proprietary, partnership, cooperative, and public firm (with NHS-style ‘social enterprises’ as a 
variant). We consider both internally-generated and externally-mandated innovations. 
Organisational studies often have ‘innovation bias’2, assuming that all innovations must be good for
everyone. To avoid that naïvety we also consider any unintended or dysfunctional consequences. 
‘Providers’ role in service design’ refers to how providers helped commissioners invent, then 
specify, new models of care or modes of treatment. We hypothesise that the narrower NHS provider
freedoms are, the more convergent the differently-owned providers' behaviour is likely to be in the 
above respects. We take patient experience to include choice of provider, clinician, time and place 
of treatment; and whether their experience of a service is satisfactory (or not), and in what ways. 
Clinical outcomes and safety were beyond the project remit. 
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Chapter 2.  The Policy Background 
We begin by explaining more fully what the diverse provision policy is and its stated aims, from 
which we develop (in Chapter 3) a some initial assumptions about the policy’s likely effects. 
Between 1947 and 1989 various private providers had continued to exist, mainly small hospitals3,4 
predominately treating privately-funded patients. They were free to select which services they 
offered to which patient groups, and have retained that freedom ever since with present-day 
consequences that later chapters report. Nevertheless, in an NHS previously dominated by 
professional partnerships (general practice) and publicly-owned providers (other services), a 
‘diverse provider’ policy implies increasing corporate, proprietary and not-for-profit providers’ 
shares of NHS-funded work. That arouses considerable public5 and Parliamentary6 interest and 
debate. It is a key source of opposition to current health policy. The 2015 public consultation about 
the NHS stimulated 127,400 responses (almost a thousand times more than previous consultations), 
the main concern among them being the extent of private sector involvement in NHS services.7 
Provider diversity intercalates with other health policies. In 2017 other high – perhaps higher – 
policy priorities were financial austerity and the ‘integration’ (i.e. better coordination) of local 
health services, respectively implemented through Sustainability and Transformation Partnershps 
(STP) and 'Vanguard' projects, as formulated in NHSE's Five Year Forward View(5YFV).8 
2.a.  Current Policy Priorities  
Public borrowing more than quadrupled in consequence of supporting the financial sector through 
the 2008 financial crisis9, leading to tighter public spending constraints outside the financial 
sector.10,11 Although the NHS was less affected than other parts of the public sector, objective 3 of 
the current NHS Mandate is to ‘ensure the NHS balances its budget … putting the right measures in
place to help spend taxpayers’ money more efficiently and reduce waste‘.12 2010 had already seen 
the ‘Nicholson challenge’ to the NHS to achieve ‘up to’ £20bn of savings by 201413 and now NHSE 
has a target date of 2020-21 for eliminating the NHS budget deficit. Some14,15 argue that the 
practical effect is a real-terms reduction in NHS spending (although that is contested12) and absolute
cuts in social care budgets.16 
The key methods for reducing the NHS deficit are the cost control, service rationalisation and care 
‘integration’ measures. Several policy documents have elaborated this agenda over the past four 
years. 
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In 2014 the 5YFV8 stated the key NHS aims now are:
1. 'upgrade in prevention and public health' (p.3)
2. 'Patients will gain greater control of their own care' (p.3)
3. 'support people with multiple health conditions, not just single diseases’ (p.3). 
4. 'comprehensive and high quality care' (p.5)
5. 'close the £30 billion gap' in projected NHS funding 'one third, one half, or all the way' (p.5).
The document’s organisational sections focussed on how organisations in the NHS need to 
cooperate with each other, and at times even merge into larger organisations, the ‘new care models’,
of which the 5YFV proposes seven. They include Multispecialty Community Providers (MCP: 
aimed at ‘horizontal’ care coordination between, above all, general practice, community health 
services (CHS) and social care); Primary and Acute Care Systems (PACS: aimed at vertical 
coordination of care); Urgent and Emergency Care Networks; and Hospital Chains.8 The first wave 
of a nationwide programme to implement them are ‘Vanguard’ sites.8 This policy is designed to 
promote integration of care. It gives little attention to promoting competition and diverse provision, 
indeed only mentions the non-NHS sector in connection with comparative wage rates. The current 
NHS Mandate12 requires that half the population of England have access to such services by 2020. 
Perhaps more relevant to provider diversity, MCPs are also to 'enable new ways of delivering care 
[...] become the focal point for a far wider range of care' (5YFV p.20), shift outpatient consultations 
and ambulatory care out of hospital, and use inputs from carers, volunteers and patients. In 
explicitly accommodating local variation and experiments, 5YFV comes close to implying that 
these new models of care might also have the structure of a social enterprise or cooperative. 
Secondly, in 2015 the relevant NHS national bodies issued a further policy document introducing 
the concept of collaborative, place based planning, the Sustainability and Transformation 
Partnerships (STP).17 This planning process will involve all ‘local leaders coming together as a 
team, developing a shared vision with the local community, which also involves local government 
as appropriate; [and] programming a coherent set of activities to make it happen’ (NHSE et al, 
2015b). Local areas were required to define their ‘transformation footprint’, which is needed in 
order to produce and deliver a local STP for the period October 2016 to March 2021. Each local 
economy is to designate one individual as leader for this process (NHSE et al, 2016). STP 
programmes address the quality and sustainability of general practice, NHS workforce, workload 
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and hospital infrastructure. At present it is difficult to see how, indeed whether, STPs will 
accommodate non-NHS providers since the latter, provider competition and provider diversity seem
barely relevant to implementing these programmes: something which the NHS Partners Network 
(representing non-NHS, mainly corporate, providers) expressed concern about.18 Not-for-profit and 
other non-NHS providers have also played little role, except for one social enterprise.17 
2.b.  NHS Quasi-Markets and Provider Diversification  
Over the longer term, provider diversification policy has been pursued by constructing and re-
constructing NHS quasi-markets, which were originally19 designed for that among other purposes. 
However the NHS contains three different quasi-market structures20, each with different 
implications for the scope and consequences of provider diversification. 
2.b.i.  Competitive Bidding
Competitive bidding has been described as ‘competition for markets’. Bidding is open to all 
providers equally. When, as often happens, a single provider wins the bid, a market without 
competition exists between bidding rounds. Whilst law, regulation and NHS guidance (see below) 
allow commissioners to invite a single bid without competition in some circumstances, the rules 
also presume that competitive tendering is usual and preferable. Insofar as services are indivisible 
or commissioners choose to seek just one provider to provide a given service, competitive bidding 
has an ‘all or nothing’ character regarding provider ownership. In those conditions service 
ownership can be ‘diverse’ only in a longitudinal, long term sense (over several contracting cycles) 
as one provider succeeds another. Optionally, competitive bidding systems can be structured so that 
it is GPs who collectively choose the winning bid(s), which is how CCGs were intended to 
function.13 
2.b.ii.  Patient Choice
This structure has been described as ‘competition in markets’. Individual patients and/or GPs 
choose a provider, and providers are paid per patient episode, i.e. according to how many referrals 
they attract and treat. The policy in England is that patients should be able to choose any ‘willing’ 
(later, ‘qualified’) provider in respect of certain services.13 The NHS Choose-and-book system, 
introduced for that purpose, is designed to ensure that for outpatient appointments each patient may 
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choose any ‘clinically appropriate’ provider with whom any ‘relevant body’ has a commissioning 
contract.21 Non-NHS-owned providers can be included if they are licensed by the Care Quality 
Commission (CQC). Patient choice also requires per-patient payments to providers. In the NHS as 
most other health systems this is accomplished by a Diagnostic Related Group (DRG) payment 
system, the English variant being called ‘Health Resource Groups’ (HRG) with National Tariffs set 
for each HRG. DRGs were invented in New York State to create a consistent payment system for all
types of provider, one that promoted provider competition on the basis of quality and eliminated 
price competition.22 In a patient choice structure, providers under diverse ownership can coexist for 
each care group because this kind of healthcare quasi-market is continually open to any licensed 
provider. 
2.b.iii.  Primary Care Based Commissioning 
In this structure, the GP (or equivalent) can exercise proxy choice of provider on behalf of the 
patient, choosing from among whatever diverse providers of non-GP services are available. GPs 
exercise this choice patient by patient, making primary care based commissioning similar to a 
patient choice structure in all main respects except that of who actually chooses the provider. 
2.c.  Two Over-arching Institutions  
The above policies and structures operate within and are constrained by two more fundamental  
policies, each with implications for provider diversity. 
2.c.i.  Universal care
The NHS is still based on the principle that it must ensure access on the basis of healthcare needs to 
publicly-funded services sufficient in range and volume to satisfy those needs, and with timely 
enough access to do so. That implies 
1. A wide spectrum of services and technical innovations, including those for small care 
groups. 
2. Proliferation of specialities, models of care, and technical innovations, especially insofar
as the medical profession is a key member of the health policy community at both 
national and hospital level. 
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3. Public hospitals functioning (as they long have done) as a carer of last resort, 
compensating for under-provision of other services.23 
Each of these conditions necessitates that the range of providers includes some which are willing to 
provide commercially relatively unattractive services, and providers (which will may but need not 
be corporations) willing to risk providing new healthcare technologies and models of care. In 
practice there is much variation in the supposedly universal service. Providers can nuance what they
actually provide so at to meet their contractual requirements but in ways that minimise the offer of 
certain services. 
 
2.c.ii.  The Bed-Pan Doctrine
Equally fundamental is the 'bedpan doctrine', usually but probably apocryphally attributed to 
Aneurin Bevan. 
‘Every time a maid kicks over a bucket of slops in a ward an agonized wail will go through 
Whitehall’.24 
Although the Health and Social Care Act (2012) attempted to weaken this doctrine by introducing 
an arms-length body (NHS England) between ministers and the NHS, it remains deep-rooted in UK 
political25 and Parliamentary culture. Ministers remain in practice accountable to parliament, and 
eventually the electorate, for the state of NHS services. In turn (although the lines of accountability 
are less clear) so do NHS England, other national-level NHS bodies such as NHS Improvement, and
beyond them NHS commissioners and, increasingly, STPs. Making providers accountable remains 
an explicit health policy trope: 
‘The Government’s reforms will empower professionals and providers, giving them more 
autonomy and, in return, making them more accountable for the results they achieve, 
accountable to patients through choice and accountable to the public at local level’13 p.4. 
Against this, CCGs have cited ‘commercial confidentiality’ as a reason for not publishing tender 
and other documents26, although this reasoning has not yet (2017) been tested in court. Maintaining 
provider accountability, for instance through the use of contracts and information systems, 
nevertheless falls to NHS commissioners especially.13 An important aspect of diverse provision is 
therefore how providers under different ownership differ, in terms of their susceptibility to public 
accountability and their transparency regarding the information required to make public 
accountability effective. 
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2.d.  Diverse Providers Policy: Aims and Rationales  
Taken together the above policies involve a set of aims and rationales for diverse provision. Since 
diverse provider policy is politically controversial we here limit ourselves to summarising the aims 
and rationales which governments (as opposed to their critics or opponents) and official bodies have
stated explicitly (as opposed to conjectural aims). Three policy aims to which provider 
diversification is particularly relevant, and which we consider in this study, are cost control, which 
requires efficiency-raising innovations; the bedpan doctrine, which among other things requires 
provider responsiveness to commissioners; and improved experiences of care for patients. 
2.d.i.  Innovation
Regarding innovation, diverse provision has a dual rationale: that non-NHS providers will introduce
innovations that NHS providers did not; and that their example will provoke NHS providers to 
devise innovations of their own27, whether through competition, institutional mimesis28 or both. The 
Gershon report29 cited the specific example of how NHS use of Independent Sector Treatment 
Centres (ISTC) forced down spot prices from private healthcare providers by 40 to 45 percent. For 
the public sector generally, policy-makers have assumed that including non-publicly owned 
providers will increase value for money by raising service quality and reducing costs (e.g. by 
‘process reform’ and increasing staff productivity).29 Some pro-privatisation think-tanks30 also argue
private providers are likely to be more efficient, productive and innovative than publicly-owned 
ones. 
Not only technical emulation is involved. The ‘New Public Management’ tends to assume that 
public organisations can and should so far as possible imitate corporate organisational structures 
and managerial practices (e.g. strategic management31), often copied from outside the health sector. 
Then, publicly-owned providers develop into ‘quasi-firms’ with: 
‘assertive senior management, importing personnel from the private sector; a smaller and 
more strategic board with empowered non-executives, often with a business background; 
and aligning managerial and professional domains through […] professionals with part-time 
managerial roles’ 32 p.3. 
From the same sources has come a ‘market logic’ (sometimes33 equated with ‘competition’). UK 
policy-makers also encourage these organisations to obtain income from non-public sources, and to 
make subcontracts and undertake joint ventures with corporations. This is thought to promote 
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efficiency through innovation. As health policy changed in these directions (and not only in the 
UK), health managers regardless of who owns their employer have tended to legitimate their work 
by enacting these norms.34 
2.d.ii.  Responsiveness to Commissioners
For diverse provision to have its intended effects, providers must be responsive to their local NHS 
commissioners. That is also a central means for maintaining the public accountability of NHS-
funded services, as the bed-pan doctrine requires. For all three quasi-market structures (see above) 
the overall coordination and commissioning role will increasingly be taken by STPs. But whoever is
commissioner, ensuring that NHS-funded providers are responsive to national policy imperatives 
and local healthcare needs requires that commissioners have sufficient information about provider 
activity to verify those points; and strong enough media of control over providers to remedy any 
shortfalls. 
Both the Commons Public Accounts Committee and the Audit Commission have considered 
whether more diverse provision may weaken provider accountability to (NHS) commissioners.35,36 
Commissioners' control over all types of provider is weakened by information asymmetry in the 
providers' favour, and commissioners' lack of managerial capacity.37,38 Early critics39 of diverse 
provision argued that this information asymmetry was greater in the case of non-NHS than NHS-
owned providers. Freedom of Information requests largely do not apply to non-public providers.40 
Moreover, it can be argued that the profit-maximising motive of privately owned providers also 
increases the incentive for them to act opportunistically by taking advantage of these informational 
asymmetries.41 To ameliorate this problem the Private Healthcare Information Network (PHIN) was 
in 2014 given a legal mandate to collect and make available data from all private healthcare 
facilities on all patients, whether privately or NHS-funded42 and make these data publicly available 
(which began in May 2017). The House of Commons Select Committee on Health and, 
retrospectively, the Audit Commission have powers to obtain evidence from providers, but these are
inherently exceptional methods. All healthcare providers, irrespective of ownership or their sources 
of funding, come under the CQC quality and finance inspection regime.
Commissioners have various ‘media of power’ by which to influence providers: commissioners’ 
managerial, above all monitoring, activity; creating a ‘negotiated order’ with providers; discursive 
control (persuasion appealling to common cultures and to evidence-bases); material and financial 
incentives; and juridical control.38 Regarding the latter, the NHS standard contract used by all 
providers includes dispute clauses avoiding the courts and using what is known as alternative 
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dispute resolution processes. Although current policy aims to provide equal treatment for providers 
of different ownership (see below), some exceptions remain. The first (but not subsequent) round of
contracts gave ISTCs guaranteed (block) payments not the HRG payments normal for NHS acute 
care.43 
2.d.iii.  Outcomes for Patients: Patient Experience and Choice
Recent UK health policy defines quality of care as comprising clinical outcomes, safety, and patient
experience.13 In these terms, two somewhat opposite policy justifications have been offered for 
provider diversification. 
The first is that that non-NHS providers will behave differently to NHS ones, bringing innovation 
and greater responsiveness to users, service quality and efficiency44: 
‘This diversity gives people more choice over where they get treated, it introduces a wider 
range of expertise into the health service, and the competition it generates incentivises all 
providers to offer the best service to patients.’ 45 p.13. 
An alternative rationale (sometimes46 argued more coherently outside than by government) argues 
that no harm will be done by introducing non-NHS providers because differences of ownership and 
the managerial consequences are (so to speak) behind-the-scenes back-office matters that are 
invisible and indifferent for patients; indeed non-NHS providers are currently encouraged to use the
NHS logo in order to blur the difference.47 Another variant plays down the importance of provider 
ownership compared with ‘how the NHS is organised and the ability of its leaders to deal with 
rapidly growing financial and service pressures’ 48 p.22), or with ‘a mix of complex policies … 
mediated by other environmental factors’(49, p.58), or compared with NHS healthcare remaining 
free at the point of use.13 
Either way, current NHS policy13 conceptualises quality of care as concerning outcomes (positive 
effects on patient functioning and pain), safety (lack of negative effects) and patient satisfaction 
(emotional and attitudinal effects). The latter assumptions draw upon (among other sources) 
‘consumerist’ ideas about patient choice being both valuable in itself and as a competitive 
mechanism through which, as explained above, diverse provision will result in innovations that 
raise service quality. Thus non-NHS provision is thought also to make services more responsive to 
users’ demands.19,50,51 
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2.e.  Concomitants  
Provider diversification involves various concomitant policies (which may also, even mainly, be 
adopted for other reasons too). 
2.e.i.  Regulation 
When the Health and Social Care Act (HSCA, 2012) took effect in April 2013 it explicitly applied 
competition law to the NHS quasi-market, with a presumption in favour of competitive procurement
of NHS-funded services.52 Monitor, the new economic regulator for the whole NHS, (since renamed
‘NHS Improvement’ along with other arms-length bodies such as the Trust Development 
Authority), acquired some functions of the former Co-operation and Competition Panel and, along 
with the national competition authorities (since April 2014 the Competition and Markets Authority 
(CMA)), powers to enforce competition law to prevent anti-competitive behaviour and to produce a 
‘level playing field’ which places neither public nor private providers at any substantial advantage 
in competing for NHS-funded contracts. The NHS Procurement, Choice and Competition 
Regulations No.2 2013 (PRCC) make NHS procurement guidelines matters for statutory regulation.
In their discussion of recent regulatory decisions Sanderson et al.53 demonstrate that regulatory 
practice has not changed substantially since the H&SC Act came into force, despite the best known 
decision of the new authorities which was to prevent the proposed merger of three NHS foundation 
trusts in Dorset in 2013. 
This regulatory regime covers all healthcare providers, whether NHS-funded or not.13 Simon 
Stevens remarked that 
‘Although external inspection and regulation of providers began as a tool of centralization, it
has turned out to be a precondition for a more plural ownership structure’.1 
For inspection and regulation are ownership-neutral54 methods of provider monitoring, not reliant 
on NHSE having hierarchical or quasi-hierarchical control over service managers. NHS 
Improvement and the CQC jointly license all providers and inspect their quality. NHS Improvement
have the somewhat ambivalent role of promoting both competition – which as noted policy-makers 
often confuse with provider diversity – and continuity of ‘key services’, for which it can authorise 
special funding arrangements should the service not otherwise be financially viable, and risk-
pooling.13 Section 75 of the H&SC Act required NHS commissioners to undertake open competitive
tendering for the provision of NHS-funded services. Later guidance appeared somewhat to relax 
this requirement, although not clarify it completely.48 NHS England has warned NHS 
commissioners that a single tender is open to challenge, and such calls should still be publicly 
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advertised to ensure that there really is only one capable provider.51,55 The NHS Standard Contract is
as the name suggests designed for use with all NHS-funded providers irrespective of ownership. 
Updated EU procurement regulations introduced in 2015 (taking effect for the NHS in 2016) 
require NHS commissioners to hold a public competition for all contracts worth more than 
€750,000, reducing the scope for commissioners to use single-tender bidding where only one ‘most 
capable provider’ exists56 (a practice which Monitor had tolerated57), although it has been suggested 
(reportedly58 by Simon Stevens) that single-tender bidding remains of value for CHS tendering. 
Ambiguous guidance59 has been issued by NHS England about how to comply with these 
regulations, which appears to allow commissioners to avoid competitive tendering in a broader 
range of circumstances. Brexit may of course eventually change or remove these regulations. 
2.e.ii.  ‘Pro-Competition’ Policies.
Nevertheless the regulation of competition has remained largely an internal matter for the NHS 
despite the increasing emphasis on competition law and external regulators.53 Further policies have 
also been used to promote competition. 
Any Qualified Provider: The Any Qualified Provider (AQP) policy stated that any licensed provider
(‘meeting rigorous quality requirements’51) which could provide services at NHS prices under the 
NHS Standard Contract was permitted to provide them. Commissioners were free to purchase 
services from any qualified provider, but each PCT was required to make at least three AQP 
contracts in 201260 and more subsequently. 
Primary Medical Care: When the GPs' contract with the NHS was revised in 1990, general practices
could instead of doing their own out-of-hours (OOH) work arrange, or pay, for other doctors to do 
so. Corporate deputising services and (still more) GP cooperatives consequently developed.61 By 
allowing general practices to opt out of OOH provision, however, the 2004 GMS contract was a 
death-blow to many cooperatives. The 1997 Personal Medical Services (PMS) scheme opened up 
primary medical care to nurse-led providers, corporate and proprietary provision. The Alternative 
Provider Medical Services (APMS) scheme permitted companies, social enterprises, mutuals, 
'groups of existing GPs'62 and combinations of these organisations to bid to operate general 
practices. 
Social Enterprises: After 2011 a small number of NHS community health services trusts were ‘spun 
out’ as the Social Enterprises described below. The government gave NHS staff the ‘right to request’
such a conversion. However NHS pensions, pay and conditions were more generous than those of 
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most non-NHS providers, making NHS staff reluctant to exercise their new 'right' and few did.61,63 
To remove that ‘barrier’13 NHS pensions rules were revised. TUPE arrangements guaranteed NHS 
pay and conditions for existing NHS staff who transferred to a provider under different ownership, 
but not for any new staff recruited by the new provider. Since 2004 governments also tried to make 
it easier for ‘third sector’ organisations (voluntary associations) to bid for health and social care 
contracts, for instance by allowing NHS organisations and local authorities to offer them larger, 
longer-term (more stable) contracts.64 
Treatment Centres: Independent sector treatment centres (ISTC)  were set up (one per Primary Care 
Trust (PCT)) specifically to carry out elective outpatient, day-patient and low-complexity in-patient 
surgery on NHS patients.65 ISTCs were initially contracted at national level with, in effect, block 
contracts but patient numbers afterwards declined.60 After the initial round of contracting some (but 
not all) ISTCs were subcontracted to their local NHS trust. Some were taken over by the NHS. 
Fair Playing Field review: The Fair Playing Field review40 identified measures to prevent quasi-
market ‘distortions’, i.e. the following types of barrier to more diverse providers entering the NHS 
quasi-market: 
1. ‘Participation‘ barriers unrelated to provider efficiency or quality 
2. Some (implicitly, non-NHS) providers facing external costs or financial rules which others 
do not (e.g. taxes, VAT rebates, more expensive capital). 
3. External factors (e.g. commissioners’ demands, public policy) preventing providers adapting
their services. 
To reduce these barriers, NHS commissioners should (the review argued) be given more stable, 
longer-term funding settlements; be allowed flexibility to let contracts of more than one year’s 
duration; and publish their intention to let new contracts. NHS cost data, quality metrics and 
‘standard currencies’ should be improved. The levels of working capital and reserves required of 
social enterprises and charities should be defined. NHS pension provisions, clinical indemnity 
arrangements, freedom of information arrangements and capital costs (but not taxes) should be 
equalised across provider types. 
2.f.  Varieties of Provider Ownership  
Occasionally policy-makers themselves distinguish the different kinds of 'private' provision, if only 
to advocate one kind of private provider by appeal to another ('GPs are private providers so what is 
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wrong with corporations providing hospital services to the NHS?'). Usually, though, UK policy 
debates about diverse providers are framed as a contrast between ‘public’ and ‘private’ ownership. 
That is simplistic. Like other developed health systems, the UK one contains at least the following 
different types of provider ownership, mostly ‘private’. 
 1. Corporations, shareholder-owned and for-profit in the sense of distributing profits as 
dividends to their owners. (In this report we use the term ‘corporate’ only in this specific 
sense.) 
 2. Proprietary, i.e. owner-managed, small firms such as single-handed GPs and the small 
private hospitals that were more prevalent before 1990.4,66 
 3. Partnerships, owned and controlled by a group of individuals, often from one particular 
profession e.g. medicine (hence, ‘professional partnership’). Decisions are made by the 
partners (but not usually their employees) on a more-or-less democratic basis. The 
organisation is owned by the partners severally. (STPs and similar inter-organisational 
networks are not ‘partnerships’ in this sense.) 
 4. Cooperatives, which are collectively owned and democratically controlled by their working 
members, who produce and sell goods or services for their own benefit61  (hence, ‘producer 
co-operative’). Each member has a vote. Usually she has no ‘share’ that she can sell or 
transfer upon leaving, although there are exceptions. 
(a) Consumer (as opposed to producer) cooperatives seek to obtain for their subscribers 
goods or services on advantageous terms.67  We know of only one healthcare consumer 
cooperative in England although Group Health and others play a large role in the USA, 
as does social health insurance (SHI) in mainland Europe. Some employ their own 
healthcare staff. Insofar as they are purely buyers and providers of healthcare, consumer 
cooperatives are outside our present remit. 
 5. Not-for-profit providers, owned and controlled by their members or subscribers through a 
self-governing body (e.g. trust) specially constituted for that purpose. They are therefore 
‘mission-driven’, the mission reflecting their members’ interests, usually in providing some 
particular service. They are ‘not-for-profit’ in that they do not distribute profits as dividends 
although some do try to make a surplus to finance service developments. Others aim only to 
break even. Some recruit volunteer labour.64 In the UK this wide category includes 
unincorporated organisations (membership organisations such as clubs), Community Interest
Companies, and Industrial and Provident Societies.68 Their scale and managerial style ranges
from small local bodies to large chains with a similar management style to some 
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corporations. Not-for-profit organisations also include most charities although in the UK 
being a charity is a legal status not a type of ownership; as is limited liability status.68
 6. Public firms, publicly owned but allowed a certain autonomy from central government. For 
NHS Foundation Trusts an increase in formal autonomy is conditional upon high levels of 
compliance with certain key, nationally uniform managerial performance targets.69 They 
compete for income (above all from ‘commissioners’, in the NHS) and have leeway to 
innovate. To a varying extents they tend to adopt new public management (NPM) ideas and 
practices, and be organisationally structured in imitation of corporations but without external
shareholders or equity. 
(a) What in the UK (but not elsewhere) are called ‘social enterprises’ are so to speak ‘semi-
public-firms’ with elected (resident, worker, user) representatives on their boards, and 
for governance but not ownership purposes a separate legal personality. Community 
Interest Companies (CIC) were an organisational form invented for these purposes.  
Although sometimes70 mis-described as ‘employee-owned’, the state in fact still owns 
these providers’ assets. Former NHS Trust social enterprises may within limits carry any 
operating surplus forward to the next financial year, but can also go bankrupt. 
(b) NHS Foundation Trusts are permitted to operate wholly-owned for-profit subsidiaries, 
providing privately-funded healthcare, but whose profits return to the NHS Trust. These 
subsidiaries may also enter into joint enterprises with non-NHS organisations. 
Organisations’ names and self-descriptions, even their legal personality, are sometimes misleading 
as to who really owns and controls them, hence which of the above categories they really belong to. 
Thus many OOH ‘cooperatives’ had essentially the same structure as a professional partnership 
general practice and kept it when converting themselves to (nominally) ‘social enterprise’ or ‘not 
for profit’ status. Outside the UK, ‘Social Enterprise’ usually means ‘producer and/or consumer co-
operative’. 
There are also hybrids.71 Under ‘functional privatisation’ a hospital or clinic remains publicly owned
but it is partly or fully managed by a non-public organisation under contract to the state42, in 
contrast to ‘formal privatisation’ when public hospitals are sold off. Examples of functional 
privatisation include 
1. ‘Administrative concession’ under which publicly-owned hospitals managed under contract 
by a private management firm, as were Hinchingbrook hospital during 2012 to 2016, 
Amadora Sintra Hospital, Portugal or the Alzira project in Spain.72 
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2. Turn-key contracts (private suppliers design and at least partly operate publicly-funded 
hospitals), such as the Private Finance Initiative (PFI: LIFT was the primary care 
equivalent73). NHS trusts contracted with consortia of corporations and private equity firms 
to plan, finance, and build hospitals, provide the ancillary services, on-site shops and car 
parking. The trust paid the consortia for these but retained clinical budgets, income and 
management. The 1996 NHS (Residual Liabilities) Act made the Secretary of State for 
Health guarantor of PFI schemes in the NHS.74 
Lastly, there are coalitions or provider networks (e.g. public-private ‘partnerships’75) containing two
or more the above kinds of organisation e.g. joint bids by general practices and proprietary firms to 
provide OOH services. 
Current policy assumes that provider diversification will have has its intended effects through the 
following sequence: 
 1. Commissioners commissioning providers with a wider range of ownership than formerly. 
 2. New patterns of management, new working practices and innovation, and greater efficiency 
develop among the more diverse providers … 
 3. … which makes providers become more responsive to commissioners and improves 
patients’ experience of NHS-funded services. 
As shown above, the policy documents contain in addition numerous more specific assertions which
elaborate and specify these three points more fully. Together this complex set of policy assumptions
constitutes a set of casual assumptions about how the policy will work76. Causal assumptions are 
empirically testable hypotheses, which raises the question of what existing research already 
suggests about the validity of these assumptions about diverse healthcare provision. We address that
question next. 
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Chapter 3.  Research Background: Provider Ownership and its Implications
3.a.  Organisational environment, structures, work-processes and outcomes  
As our analytic framework we develop an explanatory model77 which elaborates Donabedian’s78 
account of how the relationships between organisational structures, process and outcomes differ 
between organisations under different ownership. Its main elements are: 
 1. An organisation’s environment, i.e. the external resources on which the organisation 
depends, the policy and legal framework, its market and social context, which all constrain 
its owners’ activities. 
 2. An organisation's structure embodies its ownership. Through it, the owners define that 
organisation's aims and implement the work processes required to achieve specific 
objectives that realise these aims. Within a formal governance structure there may co-exist 
network-like elements of ‘informal organisation’ and market-like elements (an ‘internal 
market’ in the strict sense). 
 3. The owners' aims are realised through work processes (in healthcare, the care process) 
chosen for that purpose and successively modified by innovations intended to meet their 
aims more fully. 
 4. The work-processes produce outcomes; the extent to which the organisation satisfies its 
owners' objectives and aims, but also third parties' demands (e.g. patients' experiences79,80 
and choice, responsiveness to commissioners). 
In quasi-markets the providers' effects upon patients are mediated through and constrained by 
commissioners. For application to quasi-markets one must therefore adapt Donabedian's model to 
show how the production process impacts immediately upon commissioners, and through them 
upon patients, dividing point 4 above into outcomes for commissioners and outcomes for patients. 
The above model implies that the substantive outcomes that an organisation produces, and therefore
the content of all these relationships, may differ by organisational ownership. Therefore it is 
necessary to differentiate types of ownership clearly, which empirical studies often do not. Many 
confuse privatisation with competition, and both with contestability.81 Some studies associate 
'possibility of competition' with higher efficiency82 and quality,83–86 and others43,87,88 the opposite, but
often neither side clearly differentiates ownership types. 
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3.b.  Environment  
State-owned organisations’ critical environment is the ‘outer’ (regional and national) policy-making
domain in which its governmental 'owners'' formulate their policies for publicly owned 
organisations. 
3.c.  ‘Outer’ environment: national and regional
All providers have the same legal and regulatory environment. Many organisations (especially large
ones) try to influence it through policy communities89, lobbying, sponsorship, creating pressure and 
interest groups, influencing the mass media, and direct coercion (e.g. a ‘run on the pound', strikes). 
Often policy makers try to design these environments so as to channel provider competition into 
specific loci (e.g. to promote quality competition) and out of others (e.g. price competition through 
reducing quality or safety standards). Such regulation will tend to produce convergence among 
providers irrespective of ownership. 
State-owned bodies such as NHS Foundation Trusts44 are embedded in ‘quasi-hierarchical’90 
relationships of authority, monitoring, accountability and sanctions that obtain between whole 
separate public organisations.91 Other organisations become incorporated into this quasi-hierarchy 
to the extent that they are commissioned by public bodies. Then, the final link in the accountability 
chain92 (the link between provider and commissioner) is contractual rather than quasi-hierarchical. 
Providers appear to vary, by ownership, in how willing they are to do so. In the USA, publicly 
owned and private not-for-profit substance abuse treatment providers were more likely than for-
profit organizations to make contracts with an accountable care organisation (ACO), or plan or be 
negotiating to do so.93 
3.d.  ‘Inner’ environment
No less important for public organisations, and still more for a corporation, proprietary firm, social 
enterprise, professional partnership, cooperative or voluntary association, is the ‘inner environment’
of its local health economy. Various studies suggest that the market or quasi-market environment 
constraints on healthcare providers depend on how competitive that market is. Indeed there is some 
evidence that competitiveness rather than ownership drives market behaviour. A paradox of 
competition94 is that it produces both provider-side concentration (‘consolidation’) of ownership 
(which is occurring in England46) and a convergence of work-processes, service patterns, 
performance. It has been suggested95 that the differences, by hospital ownership, in outcomes for 
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renal patients were lower in the USA when for-profit hospitals faced competition. In Germany, 
differently-owned healthcare provider types converged in terms how they used of mergers.96 DRG 
payment led to convergence in average length of stay (ALoS) across all types of hospital.97 After the
introduction of DRGs there was no significant difference between costs or technical efficiency 
between German for-profit and public hospitals.98 In Italy too DRG-based payments seemed to 
make for-profit99, not-for-profit100 and public hospitals converge in terms of technical efficiency. 
Providers with large market shares tend to set pricing and quality patterns across the health 
system101, so the behaviour of different types of provider may depend partly on the overall mix102 
and converge over time. Corporations, public organisations34 and partnerships also try to limit the 
effects of competition by merging34 or by creating 'alliances' (cartels). Non-publicly owned 
organisations face the possibility of merger or takeover, especially if their shares are publicly 
traded. Corporate, proprietary, cooperative, not-for-profit and partnerships may also be exposed to 
competition outside of the quasi-market, indeed often originate outside it. Then they face dual 
competitive pressures, both for public contracts and for privately-paid sales. For them an important 
environmental consideration is then whether the two income streams are purely additive or whether 
pursuing one might compromise (‘cannibalise’103) the other. Geographical (e.g. urban vs. rural) and 
demographic characteristics also constrain how competitive a local market104 or quasi-market is. 
How tightly the commissioners can constrain providers of any ownership depends on three factors: 
the commissioners’ choice of service specification; their bargaining power with providers; and how 
far commissioners can ensure provider compliance with the agreed specification. A first stage in a 
commissioning cycle is for the commissioner to specify what service and/or price it wants.38 In 
theory, the commissioners then structure competitive bidding process, or the ways in which patients 
or GPs choose providers, so as the make providers compete to meet these specifications. How far 
providers accept the commissioner’s specification depends in practice on their relative bargaining 
power. In quasi-markets the availability of alternate providers (see below) may make a provider 
contestable81, but conversely when the provider faces multiple public commissioners and/or private 
payers (private health insurers, patients with health insurance, employers, patients who can pay out-
of-pocket) the commissioner becomes contestable from the provider’s standpoint, with an increase 
in the provider’s bargaining power. Depending on the balance of negotiating power the 
commissioner can become either a service and/or price ’maker’ (setting a service specification then 
seeking suppliers for it), or a service and/or price ‘taker’ (choosing from what providers offer).105 
Competitive-bidding structures assume that commissioners are ‘makers’, patient choice structures 
more that commissioners (and patients and GPs) are ‘takers’. How far the commissioner can ensure 
provider compliance with whatever service specifications the commissioner and provider have 
agreed then depends on how the commissioner uses the media of power38 mentioned in Chapter 2 
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(commissioners’ planning and monitoring capacity; a ‘negotiated order’ with the provider; 
persuasive appeal to EBM, managerial ideology or public policy; providers’ resource dependency 
on the commissioners: provider competition or contestability (again); and juridical contract-
enforcement and regulatory controls available in the ‘outer’ environment (see above)). 
As noted, the NHS combines three different designs of quasi-market20: competitive bidding; patient 
choice-based; and primary care doctor based. Because the three differ in how much power over 
providers they give to commissioners, and to which commissioners,106 the policy outcomes resulting
from diverse provider ownership might therefore also be expected to vary in each. 
3.e.  Constraining away the differences
Whatever the internal organisational pressures for each type of provider to develop in specific ways,
strong regulatory, quasi-hierarchical107 or contractual control providers may in practice reduce, even
negate, any differentiation in the work processes, hence the 'real-side' outcomes of, differently-
owned healthcare providers. Evidence based medicine has increasingly standardised clinical work 
processes108,109 which in turn reflect clinical techniques and human biology, neither determined by 
organisational ownership. Professional bodies' disciplinary influence is indifferent to provider 
ownership.110 Professional cultures are similar across providers.111,112 Budget constraints can also 
mean that providers ‘sometimes collaborated with their competitors and competed with their 
collaborators’ irrespective of ownership 44 pp.9-10). 
Organisational cultures can also promote convergence. When corporate models of organisation and 
management are ideologically dominant,113 managers, irrespective of who owns their organisation, 
often imitate what they take (or mistake) for corporate practice, e.g. management fads such as 
mergers.34 Assuming the same ‘isomorphic’ mechanisms operate in the NHS as elsewhere,28 one 
would then expect NHS quasi-market structures, organisational structures, institutional logics and 
managerial practice to converge upon corporate norms; and similarly in local government, not-for-
profit organisations and the professions.114 Managerial cultures at times also clash with not-for-
profit providers’ original 'mission'.115 Managers in NHS trusts may believe that, for political reasons,
their organisation is ‘too big to fail’38 but in 2008 that belief was also current in large financial 
corporations. 
There are also practical reasons for convergent managerial practices. The practical difference 
between non-corporate providers aiming to attract income to develop their activity and corporations
seeking income for shareholders may also be slight for employees and middle managers, as opposed
to top managers and shareholders. When their sheer expansion necessitates a more elaborate 
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structure, professional partnerships evolve into ‘managed professional firms’ with a hierarchy of 
senior and junior partners.116 
3.f.  Organisational structure  
3.g.  Owners’ aims
We define ownership as beneficial ownership i.e. who in practice ultimately controls and benefits 
(and is ultimate recipient of surpluses or debts) from a given organisation. Diversity of ownership 
implies diversity of aims. 
Usually researchers take maximising117,118 the owners’ monetary profits ('return on investment') as 
corporations' prime aim. Indeed in the UK it is their managers’ and directors’ main statutory 
responsibility. Simon119 argued rather that corporations 'satisfice' their profits. Either way, the main 
structural consequence is that corporations require organisational structures for maintaining 
shareholder control and returning income to them, often achieved by developing separate 
specialised structures for coordinating production (line management, project teams etc.) and for 
financial purposes (holding companies, corporate governance structures, audit etc.).120 
As creatures of policy, public firms' main aims are typically policy implementation, sustaining the 
legitimation of government, of local MPs40 and indeed the political regime as a whole.113 For NHS 
Foundation Trusts an increase in formal autonomy is conditional upon high levels of compliance 
with certain key, and nationally uniform, managerial performance targets.69 
 Partnerships’ and cooperatives’121 aims typically centre upon satisficing the members’ (or partners') 
personal income and maintaining their control over working life, including doing what they regard 
as worthwhile, high-quality work befitting their expertise and status.61 
Small proprietary providers such as nursing homes also seek profits122 but here ‘profit’ represents 
the owner’s personal income, not external dividends or other rentier payments. 
Not-for-profit, and especially voluntary, organisations are ‘mission driven’: their primary goal is to 
deliver a particular service.40 UK policy-makers have therefore often seen these organisations as 
being particularly motivated and capable at tackling the most ‘wicked’ social, environmental and 
health problems.64 Like cooperatives, not-for-profit organisations must raise enough income to 
cover their costs, but doing so may lead them to acquire the secondary objective of income 
growth115, sometimes inaccurately described as their 'commercialisation'. 
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Irrespective of ownership, disputes among the owners, and between the owners and others, may in 
practice compel the owners to moderate or qualify their original aims or to accommodate also 
others' (possibly incompatible) aims. In this kind of 'negotiated order'123 one observes only 
comprised, even obfuscated, forms of the respective aims, which empirically may be be formulated 
as 'performance', 'targets', 'impacts', 'goals', 'mission', ‘objectives’ etc. as the case may be. 
3.h.  Hierarchy and democracy 
Organisational research literature differentiates two main types of organisational structure, 
according to whether the actual producers also own and control the organisation. Corporations, 
public firms and (some) social enterprises are not generally producer-controlled. They therefore 
differ less in their internal structures, that of bureaucratic hierarchy124 (‘machine bureaucracy’125), 
than in their external accountabilities and what substantive imperatives are transmitted through the 
hierarchy, the corresponding organisational cultures, the scope for functional differentiation and 
autonomy in their subordinate divisions or units, and senior managers’ decision-making methods.77 
Marketing and financial structures are generally more salient and developed in corporations and 
not-for-profit organisations than in public firms, cooperatives or partnerships. 
Because its formation as a profession preceded that of the centralised state, the British medical 
profession’s self-image of their status and role retained much of the self-image of the individual 
‘free’ professional, proprietor or partner.114 Subsequent hierarchies who needed their skills therefore 
faced the problem of how to incorporate this independent, non-hierarchical occupation: 
 1. NHS hospitals ('public firms') have traditionally had parallel uniprofessional ‘silos’126 with, 
at the top, a stratum of ‘hybrid’ medical managers linking non-medical managers with 
medical non-managers127,128; and analogously in the other clinical professions. Care is 
coordinated across silos through 'matrix management'129 and project teams.130 
 2. Corporate and not-for-profit hospitals sometimes have the above structure. Managerial 
control over doctors, including willingness to dismiss doctors, is reportedly more overt and 
directive in ISTCs than NHS Trusts.27 However the smaller corporate and not-for-profit 
hospitals may instead have an 'admitting rights' structure which more sharply separates 
general and medical management. The hospital owners can grant or withdraw individual 
doctors’ admitting rights, but since they depend on doctors for patient admissions they are 
usually more concerned to attract than control doctors. 
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As public firms, NHS Foundation Trusts were designed to imitate aspects of not-for-profit 
organisations and of corporations whilst remaining publicly-owned. Unlike earlier NHS trusts, they 
have a dual governance structure comprising a Board of Governors which may include members of 
staff, local residents, the local municipal authority and NHS commissioners). They appoint the chair
and non-executive director members of a board of directors, which also includes the chief executive
and a small number of other executive directors.68 
Professional partnerships have a dual structure: an essentially democratic structure among the 
partners and, managed by them, a subtended hierarchy of other staff as employees. The medical 
partners may be occasionally supplemented with members of other clinical professions and/or 
managers. Salaried doctors and other staff representatives may occasionally be included as honorary
partners for decision-making (although not necessary equity ownership) purposes.61 UK out of 
hours cooperatives are modelled on general practices but the democratic layer is proportionately 
larger. 
Not-for-profit organisations, especially large ones, often have a subtended hierarchy of employed 
staff, even managers. A not-for-profit organisation's external accountability is typically to its 
external members, subscribers or donors. An important component of voluntary organisations' 
structures are therefore structures for obtaining donations and for recruiting volunteers, hence for 
propagating the organisation's aims and a corresponding internal ethos. In smaller, more ‘voluntary’ 
not-for-profit organisations much of the work (including management) is done by volunteers, who 
may themselves elect some of their managers or directors. 
The term ‘Social Enterprise’ is ill-defined. Outside the UK it usually refers to democratic 
organisations such as co-operatives or mutuals which are neither publicly owned nor for-profit131. In
the NHS ‘social enterprise’ often (but not always) refers to a spun-off but still publicly-owned 
organisation. In both settings the term can also refer to the organisations making up the non-
statutory ‘social economy’.132 
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3.i.  Coordinating and controlling work processes
An organisational structure is also the means through which its owners coordinate, motivate and 
control the people ('producers') who actually undertake operate the production process so as to 
realise the owners’ aims. Through that structure the owners therefore: 
1. Obtain whatever external resources the work process requires 
2. Direct and control the actual producers’ activities so as to execute the work process, 
which above all involves coordination (division of labour; task sequencing; transmitting 
work-in-progress from one producer to another; information-transmission; bringing the 
product or service to its users or vice-versa). 
3. Observe the producers, work process and products to check the accomplishment of the 
owners’ intentions, diagnosing and remedying any shortfalls. 
4. Regularise, formalise and legitimate the above activities, hence maintain the required 
communication channels. 
If one would expect these activities to be most intense and systematic in respect of the aims that are 
most important to the owners, the observed patterns of ‘tight-loose’ control133 including the criteria 
by which managerial performance is assessed and which goals preoccupy managers in practice, 
would be evidence of what aims the owners prioritise. Similarly, the most confidential or secret 
matters might also be assumed important to the owners’ aims. 
Corresponding to their different, if sometimes compromised, aims organisations under different 
ownership have correspondingly distinct institutional logics,114 internal managerial regimes,37,134–138 
skills, 'ethos'139 and 'cultures'.140,141 ‘Culture’ is the 'taken-for-granted, shared, tacit ways of thinking, 
perceiving and reacting', above all its members' normative140 representation of how the organisation 
ought to work in respect of (e.g.) working practices, behaviour (e.g. initiative, integrity, flexibility), 
and relationships specifically with patients. Different cultures at times understand the same term 
differently. For corporations, ‘environment’ means above all ‘market’, and they can take having 
wide financial and managerial discretion for granted.32 For public firms, the opposite often applies.34
Culture and logics differ within as well as between organisations.33,140 In healthcare, tensions persist 
between ‘sedimented’142 managerial (sometimes33 confusingly called ‘corporate’) and professional 
cultures.137 Divergent cultures limit how far an organization’s managers can, as often assumed,143,144 
manage its culture to taste. The mutual accommodation of conflicting interests may compromise an 
its managerial culture as well as its owners’ aims. Rival cultures are accommodated and preserve 
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their identities through such localized means as ‘special case’ decision-making, informal 
consultation, jointly resisting common adversaries (e.g. government policy), shared short-term 
innovative projects137 and ‘ceremonial’ but incomplete implementation of what each culture 
demands.34 In contrast, an organisation’s members also experience and understand how the 
organisation works in reality; its climate. For instance a proclaimed culture of ‘psychological 
safety’145 may contrast with a climate in which 'whistle-blowers' are punished. 
3.j.  Process  
3.k.  Selection of core process: institutional logic and technology
To achieve their aims an organisation’s owners establish a labour (e.g. a care) process,146,147 
coordinated through their organisational structure and which they expect to realise those outcomes. 
Selecting a core process is implicitly the adoption of a logic model76 and institutional logic.114 A 
core process is defined by its aim(s) rather than technologically since the same technology can serve
different institutional logics. An organisation might use physical exercise, say, just for the 
immediate physical effects (e.g. club members’ pleasure); or embed it within a financial process 
(e.g. a commercial gym); or to pursue a policy ‘mission’ (e.g. reducing healthcare demand). 
3.l.  Care process and care groups
Differently-owned providers tend to prefer to offer different kinds of services,148 at different 
locations and for different patient groups.101,149,150 Corporations especially are often accused of 
'cream-skimming' the most profitable care groups and ‘dumping’ the rest. Corporations locate 
services where paying customers are likely to be found, for instance in Bath because of its socio-
economic profile, in the case of Circle. 151 Corporations can always ‘dump’ unprofitable contracts, 
and have done so (e..g for NHS community health services, the ‘functional privatisation’ of 
Hinchingbrooke hospital6,152). So can social enterprises (e.g. mental health services in Cornwall). In 
Germany, privatisation of small rural hospitals led to closure of labour-intensive, hence costly, 
services (A&E, paediatrics).42 However, accusations that ISTCs 'cherry-pick' patients compared 
with NHS services for the same patient groups appear unsubstantiated153, even though ISTCs were 
designed to treat only the care groups profitable to corporations.27 
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3.m.  Care process and innovation
When a work-process fails to meet their aims, its owners’ usual recourse is, if they can, to innovate 
with (in healthcare) new clinical techniques or models of care (e.g. to reduce side-effects154), 
whether locally invented or copied (as ISTCs copied NHS use of chair-based post-operative 
recovery and discharge lounges42). Organisations are most ‘receptive’ to,2,155,156 i.e. select, 
innovations which are compatible with their: 
 1. 'Values', i.e. the owners' aims. 
 2. Working practices (including technical compatibility) 
 3. Existing organisational structures, control and ownership. 
Hence different ownership implies different selections of innovations155–158 and technologies.78 
Observed care processes are a sedimentation of such innovations, plus any unofficial work-arounds 
added by workers themselves.27,159,160 
 
3.n.  Expansionary development 
In quasi-markets where cash follows individual patients, and commissioners must pay for all 
treatments actually given, all providers have an incentive to attract patient referrals (supplier-
induced demand161). To expand profits, corporations naturally seek (circumstances permitting) to 
expand their activities, even by replication without increasing technical efficiency. That is, to 
expand services which in marketing terms are either ‘cash cows’ or ‘stars’.162 
 1. ‘Cash cows’ in healthcare typically are commodified services for frequently-occurring 
conditions161 with controllable, predictable costs because they have standardised, discrete 
treatments. Corporations then extract profits by offering these services at high volume and 
with low unit cost.25 In the UK and elsewhere corporate hospitals focus on less complex, 
younger patients and with better mental health status and higher income163–165. In England, 
planned acute hospital treatment in gynaecology, ophthalmology, orthopaedics and plastic 
surgery88 best satisfy these criteria; in England and Australia, elective surgery generally.166 
Further income can be gained by offering the patient or commissioner supplementary 
technical elaborations (e.g. screening, post-discharge domiciliary care) or upgraded 'hotel' 
services. Until the introduction of DRG payments, German private hospitals would increase 
lengths of stay to raise revenue.167 
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 2. ‘Star’ services which the corporation has a unique advantage in providing and high profit 
margins e.g. because of fee-for-service (i.e. cost-plus) payment. 
Expansionary profit seeking also motivates corporations also to innovate in pricing, e.g. by dividing
episodes of care up into into discrete chargeable items168: 
‘In Ireland, patients in that have complications after care in private hospital often need to go 
back to the GP and get a referral, which leads to affordability issues.’42 
It also motivates marketing to patients and gatekeepers, reporting or comparing the corporation’s 
clinical outcomes, quality of clinicians, facilities, patient satisfaction and waiting times.
In many countries, public firms’ policy mandates include guaranteeing access to treatment for the 
full range of conditions and (especially for university hospitals) developing new clinical 
interventions and models of care.34 Pharmaceuticals apart, university (i.e. public) hospitals are the 
traditional source of 'technology push' in healthcare115, concomitantly developing a wide-spectrum 
service profile and technical innovations, even for small care groups and patients with ambulatory 
care sensitive conditions.169 Because of their political salience public hospitals may also face 
pressure to adopt ad hoc symbolic innovations to show that 'something has been done' to remedy 
some policy problem or exposed service deficiency.
Partnerships, cooperatives and (early in their development) proprietaries develop to pursue the 
interests of their working owners. Hence they innovate so as to:
 1. Raise the owners’ working conditions, income and status, hence: 
(a) Delegate other work from the partners to employees, e.g. for medical partners to focus 
on acute clinical170 work.
(b) Maintain partners’ autonomy in how they work. Hospital- or HMO-employed doctors in 
the USA were more likely than independent ones to use electronic records171 and 
evidence-based care management processes. 
 2. Minimise external ‘stakeholders’' influence, hence favouring internally-funded innovation 
which for all but the largest co-operatives implies labour- rather than capital-intense 
innovation. 
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 3. Pursue the organisation’s (non-financial) ‘mission’, which in healthcare implies selecting 
innovations for on the basis of evidence about their technical effectiveness. 
 4. Increase the equity value of the infrastructure, insofar as partners can withdraw their share 
on leaving the enterprise. 
The above contrasts might explain two empirical findings. Since incremental innovation results 
more from 'market pull', it is likelier to appear in corporations, partnerships and proprietaries; and 
since radical innovation results more from 'technology push', it is more likely to originate in 
university (i.e. public) providers.154 Interpreting ‘divergent’ innovation as including changes to 
existing professional jurisdiction, the above contrasts also explain the slight evidence, from the 
USA, that for-profit hospitals there are more likely to make 'divergent' (radical) innovations than 
public and non-profit hospitals.104 
Expansionary corporations might appear more likely than other providers to achieve economies of 
scale. But in practice public hospitals in the NHS (and most health systems) are usually larger to 
start with. These contrasting factors may explain why the evidence about the relationship between 
ownership and economies of scale is complex. Large (> 1000 bed) German for-profit hospitals 
operated more efficiently than their public counterparts,172 suggesting that the former more fully 
exploited economies of scale, but when taking the quality of care into account the efficiency 
differences were less. 
3.o.  Cost reduction
Transaction cost theory asserts173 that those who own and control an organisation will seek to reduce
costs in ways that so far as possible conserve their own income and power, which implies that 
differences in ownership will produce different cost reduction foci. 
Hierarchically-structured corporate, proprietary and publicly owned hospitals face similar cost-
reducing innovation options: 
 1. Reducing expensive, i.e. clinicians', labour since about two-thirds of healthcare costs are for 
labour through: 
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(a) Low staffing levels, of which Serco's out-of-hours service in Cornwall was a publicised 
example.174 Facing the same cost patterns, however, NHS services are also understaffed 
at times (Mid Stafford Hospital being the notorious example175). 
(b) Reducing developmental or training ‘overhead’.27 
(c) Substituting cheaper (e.g. nursing, therapists or even unskilled) labour for expensive 
clinicians’ labour. 
(d) Shift employers’ costs elsewhere by using an admitting rights model for doctors mainly 
employed by public hospitals. 
 2. Replace inpatient with outpatient and/or primary care.
However corporations would appear to have less scope than publicly-owned hospitals for saving 
‘hotel’ costs, since that would remove a selling point to private patients. Against this, by 
concentrating on ‘commodified’ treatments corporate hospitals may through standardisation176 be 
able to increase their technical efficiency more than the wider case-mix lets public hospitals do. 
Specialised public treatment centres had 18%, and private treatment centres 40%, shorter ALoS 
than NHS hospitals even after controlling for differences in age, gender, number and type of 
diagnoses, deprivation and regional variation, suggesting that these differences reflected efficiencies
not 'skimming'.177 
For public hospitals, past austerity policies have stimulated informal innovations for tacitly 
'rationing' access through increasing waiting times, more stringent gate-keeping, higher referral 
thresholds.178,179  
Cooperatives, social enterprises, professional partnerships, proprietary and not-for-profit providers 
face the weaker financial imperative to cover, not minimise, their costs.180,181 In them, Niskanen’s 
theory implies173, cost reduction will only as a last resort be achieved by reducing partners’, 
cooperators’ or proprietors’ income. 
Some methods of cost reduction appear ownership-neutral: 
 1. Reducig ‘industrial’ and consumables, e.g. pharmaceuticals, costs.182 
 2. Cost-shifting to other providers, commissioners, patients, informal carers or volunteers. For 
example Irish private hospitals require patients to make their own post-discharge 
arrangements before starting treatments, so as to avoid bed-blocking.42 
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The multiple combinations of cost reduction methods available, some of them not ownership-
specific, may partly explain the mixed evidence about differences in production costs between 
providers under different ownership.183 German private hospitals were on average less technically 
efficient than public hospitals until DRG payments were introduced.167 Even then, public hospitals 
remained more efficient than for-profit hospitals.172,184,185 Not-for-Profit hospitals were less efficient 
than either public or for-profit hospitals.172,184 Indeed converting German public hospitals into public
firms increased their efficiency to the extent of creating 'likely an effective alternative to 
privatization'.186 Italian for-profit hospitals were less technically efficient than public and not-for-
profit hospitals, possibly because the private hospitals faced regulations that set an unstable limit to 
their admissions.176 (However, unstable admission levels are normal for public hospitals in most 
health systems.) The quality improvements for hip fracture patients following the introduction of a 
revised DRG system which incentivised prompt treatment were greater in private (albeit from a 
lower starting-point) than in public hospitals.187 
3.p.  Commissioners as intermediaries  
The care processes from which commissioners choose might therefore vary to begin with on 
account of providers’ diverse ownership. Because a commissioner in a quasi-market selects which 
care processes and service specifications to purchase for its population, it mediates the ways in 
which the providers’ care processes produce outcomes for patients. Commissioners make this 
selection in light of the commissioners’ own and, ultimately, the government’s priorities; and 
patients’ preferences and interests (expressed through e.g. patient participation or involvement, 
consumer research, patients’ complaints about providers). 
3.q.  Monitoring compliance: provider transparency
Transparency of provider information about services is a precondition for providers’ public 
accountability. It is also a precondition for commissioners being able to influence how providers 
respond to them, but information asymmetry compromises commissioners’ capacity to do so.188 
Information publication reduces this asymmetry (and that between providers and patients 172). One 
would expect least transparency where there was a history of disputes ('low trust') or infrequent or 
interrupted contact between provider and commissioner (e.g. due to commissioner re-organisation 
and staff turnover). Provider transparency also however seems partly to depend upon provider 
ownership. 
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Secrecy (‘commercial in confidence’ rules, non-disclosure agreements, 'intellectual property' rights) 
prevents public access to information that would weaken one provider’s business models and/or 
bargaining position by helping another provider to make commissioners a better offer. Empirically, 
corporations seem especially prone to secrecy. A recent Europe-wide study found that: 
‘Obtaining data about any dimension of quality from private hospitals was difficult in all the
countries included in the case studies. Data is usually provided by private hospitals on the 
areas of quality where they excel … this data is considered to be commercially sensitive and
private hospitals are wary of quality indicators being misrepresented by the media. Problems
with care may only be … uncovered by the media or if patients are referred to public 
hospitals’42, p.66). 
Initially the publicly available (Hospital Episode Statistics (HES)) data about private treatment 
centres under contract to the NHS were initially too incomplete to enable comparisons between 
public and corporate providers,189 although they have subsequently become less so. At the time of 
writing (July 2017), the publicly available data on the Private Healthcare Information Network were
entirely inadequate for that purpose. Whilst corporate providers are used to providing activity data 
promptly to non-NHS payers (some of whom will not pay them otherwise), sharp practice has 
occasionally occurred in providing such data to NHS commissioners.174 The lack of transparent 
monitoring data about corporate contractors’ performance is also reported more widely.190 Up-
coding to increase providers’ reimbursement appears to be more characteristic of corporate than 
other hospitals191–194 (and possibly also not-for-profit hospitals in Germany195). 
In Public Firms a residual public service ethos favours public accountability but in practice it does 
not so readily extend to policy failures, influence or patronage that policy-makers would rather not 
publicise,196 nor to what whistle-blowers sometimes reveal.197 Bidding to commissioners can 
motivate public firms to exaggerate their costs, hence inflate prices.44 Information asymmetries that 
impede informed consumer choice are also likely to be lower in social enterprises and voluntary 
organisations, especially if they are client-controlled68; and in co-operatives, especially consumer 
cooperatives such as Group Health which employ their own health-workers.67 
3.r.  Costs and responsiveness to commissioners
Among the aims which commissioners pursue in mediating the relationship between provider and 
patient are health policy implementation, containing the costs of healthcare for the state, and 
adjusting providers’ care processes as the local ‘inner’ environment changes. Many studies report 
associations between organisational type and provider behaviour regarding prices,101,198–201 
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contractual flexibility (corporations and proprietaries being less flexible),38,202 and responsiveness to 
financial incentives.188,203 
Where DRGs (in England, HRGs) are used and commissioners have little discretion in whether or 
what to pay for work already done, providers of any ownership often just to do the work and bill the
commissioner irrespective of the commissioner’s wishes.44,204 Then, corporate marketing 
characteristically addresses patients or GPs directly, by-passing the commissioner. In response, 
some publicly-owned hospitals (at least, in England, Germany and parts of Italy38) agree with their 
commissioners an expected volume and mix of cases, with full DRG payment for the cases within 
that 'corridor', and decreasing (eventually zero) incremental payments for cases above or below 
those limits. 
Any large provider with spare capacity can exploit economies of scale by offering commissioners 
services that it already provides in other market segments, in doing so spreading their fixed costs. 
Among for-profit providers, competition may even facilitate price-raising168 (cp. also US study of 
dialysis (Cutler, private correspondence)). Some writers205,206 argue that organisations (corporations, 
proprietaries) which distribute profits to their owners therefore face stronger incentives than public 
sector organisations to reduce costs. However, if providers insist on their contract the gains from 
increased technical efficiency accrue to top managers and shareholders, not to commissioners as 
price reductions. NHS foundation trusts, however, have not done this, instead usually negotiating 
‘local variations’ and other non-contractual payment adjustments at the end of each financial year.179
In cooperatives and partnerships, it is the cooperators or partners who benefit from increases in 
technical efficiencies, insofar as the efficiencies are neither a cause nor consequence of price or 
output changes that reduce the co-operative’s income. 
3.s.  Outcomes for patients: experience and choice  
Healthcare quality can be conceptualised, in terms of patients’ rather than providers’ needs207, as 
comprising outcomes (positive effects on functioning and pain), safety (no avoidable negative 
effects) and satisfaction (emotional and attitudinal effects). Patient choice of services is an aspect of
the latter, insofar as it enables the patient to obtain the services best fitted to her preferences about 
what ends clinical care serves and the impacts of care upon her daily life. Providers under different 
ownership differ in their use of ‘exit’ rather than ‘voice’208 mechanisms for discovering and 
responding to patients’ demands, but to complicate matters commissioning through competitive 
tendering relies upon ‘voice’, commissioning through a patient choice system more upon ‘exit’. 
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3.t.  Quality and safety
The effect of profit-seeking on aspects of service quality that are not contracted for, or invisible to 
external monitoring, may also be adverse.205 North American studies report associations between 
organisational type (hence ownership) and provider behaviour regarding some clinical outcomes 
(small differences209, sometimes none210), and quality.101,211 Garg212 found that patients treated in 
American not-for-profit hospitals were more likely to receive transplantation, and their mortality 
rate was lower, than in for-profit hospitals. French for-profit hospitals were less likely to have 
someone on the pre-emptive registration list for renal transplantation than (public) university 
hospitals were, although pre-emptive transplantation is associated with a longer survival.213 In 
France the risk associated with re-vascularisation (a standardised uncomplicated treatment) is 
higher in for-profit than public hospitals.214 Publicly owned and not-for-profit substance abuse 
treatment organizations provided a richer array of services for their (US) patients, including HIV 
testing and other medical care, than for-profit ones.215–217 Despite serving often sicker, poorer 
populations US community health centres perform as well or better than private practice primary 
care on ambulatory care measures.218–220 
3.u.  Experience of care
NHS patients rated some non-clinical aspects of care quality higher in ISTCs than in NHS hospitals,
others lower (mostly small differences).37 Similar total scores for quality across different provider 
types masked differences in which aspects of quality each type of provider managed better.221 
Outcomes for cataract extraction, inguinal hernia repair, hip replacement, knee replacement and 
varicose vein surgery appear similar in Treatment Centres and NHS hospitals.153,222 German patients 
perceived non-profit hospitals as more trustworthy but less competent than for-profits.223 In primary 
medical care, providers holding APMS contracts performed significantly worse than PMS/GMS 
practices on 13 of 17 quality indicators (including all measures of clinical quality) during 2008-13, 
and worse on two additional quality indicators in at least three of those five years; but better than 
other practices in terms of percentage of patients satisfied with opening hours and the percentage 
who were prescribed low-cost statins.224 This pattern was found among newly-entered providers 
(likelier to be proprietary or corporate) not among existing providers (likely to be professional 
partnerships) which had changed to an APMS contract.224 Treating patients with multiple chronic 
conditions effectively often requires combining the work of different providers into a coherent 
‘integrated’ sequence. In practice, corporate providers appear less prone to cooperate across 
organisational boundaries than do other types of provider.27,225 Patients’ referrals even between NHS 
providers are often problematic, and those between providers under different ownership likely to be 
more so.50 
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3.v.  Choice
‘Consumerist’ policies require that patients choose their healthcare providers on instrumental 
grounds (access, waiting times, location, quality, provider's reputation etc.). Corporations and 
proprietary providers are accustomed and adapted to this standard market mechanism. However 
consumerist assumptions face two main empirical challenges. The affective aspects of choice (e.g. 
relational continuity with a preferred individual professional) co-exist with, indeed often outweigh, 
instrumental choice.226 Also the standard micro-economic view of instrumental choice has itself 
been criticised as empirically unrealistic because it assumes impossible cognitive skills227 or 
impossibly perfect information.228 
3.w.  Voice
‘Voice’ methods229 make user representation in decision-making or advisory bodies providers’ 
mechanism for discovering and responding to users' demands, especially in public providers, social 
enterprises, voluntary organisations, complex care pathways involving multiple organisations, and 
professional partnerships. These organisations have relied upon: 
1. Patient and public involvement (PPI) in decision-making bodies. In NHS Foundation Trusts,
those local residents who volunteer to be public members elect governors, who then elect 
the majority of the trust board. Nevertheless, getting uniform patient participation in the 
governance and in making the FT accountable to them has proved difficult in practice.230 
2. Representation of user’ views through consumer research, typically routine surveys. Such 
surveys often tend to focus on non-clinical aspects of quality (e.g. food, room, waiting 
times, staff behaviour)42, and patient satisfaction, although PROMs are an exception. 
3. Subscriber (i.e. patients) elect the governing body members of social health insurers (as in 
Germany) consumer cooperatives, some of which (e.g. Group Health in the USA231) own 
and directly manage the healthcare providers which their patients use. 
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Chapter 4.  Methods
4.a.  Design  
Since policy interventions are beyond researchers' control an observational study was the strongest 
feasible research design for answering the research questions in Chapter 1. To understand how the 
different managerial regimes inside the 'black box' of the private or public provider influence 
organisations’ behaviour required theory-driven qualitative methods.232 The theories we used were 
the organisational theory and transaction cost economics233,234 mentioned in Chapter 3. To assess 
how generalisable the findings were required more quantitative methods. We therefore used a mixed
methods comparison of different organisational types of providers combining: 
1. Systematic comparison of organisational case studies describing how providers under 
different ownership managed innovation and responded to NHS commissioners, and (Work 
Package 1). 
2. Comparative qualitative study of patient experiences and choice (Work Package 2). 
3. Contextualising quantitative analysis of routine administrative data and of geographical data, 
to assess how typical, of their kind the case-study organisations were (Work Package 3). 
Table 1 shows how each method contributed to answering each research question. 
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Table 1: Research questions, methods, data, analyses
Research Question Method Data Sources Analysis
How do 
differently 
owned providers 
of NHS-funded 
services vary in 
respect of their 
responses to: 
Innovation and use of freedoms 
to innovate (RQ1)? 
Organisational case studies Interviews: managerial and 
policy documents; media 
rapportage; ad hoc 
supplementary enquiries; 
published studies. 
Systematic comparison 
through framework analysis;
induction; test and revise 
initial explanatory 
framework (Chapter 3). 
NHS commissioners, regarding 
service design, foci of 
interactions, changed 
requirements, national policies, 
transparency and information 
(RQ2)? 
Interviews: observation of 
commissioning meetings; 
managerial and policy 
documents; ad hoc 
supplementary enquiries; 
published studies. 
Patients’ experience of services, 
choice of provider (RQ3)?. 
Qualitative analysis of patients’ 
reported experience
Focus groups, interviews. 
What implications for commissioning and 
managerial practice (RQ4)? 
Deduction and inference from 
answers to RQs 1-3. 
Findings for RQs 1-3. Logical analysis. 
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Our underlying methodology was realist.235 We regarded different forms of provider ownership as 
being alternative mechanisms for promoting the types of innovations and responsiveness to NHS 
commissioners and patients mentioned in Chapter 1. In Chapter 3 we formulated initial theories 
about these mechanisms. The findings chapters below then compared these theories with our new 
evidence, revising and refining the theory as the evidence dictated. This falsificationist236,237 
approach built reflexivity into the study by making us look for errors in the theories which we 
initially brought to our new data. In that way we could arrive at a more strongly evidence-based 
account of how and why differences in provider ownership produced differences in the policy 
outcomes of interest. 
4.b.  Systematic comparison of organisational case studies  
To reveal and explain any connections between provider ownership and differences in the relevant 
policy outcomes (innovation, responsiveness to commissioners, patient experience), we 
systematically compared case studies of differently-owned providers in terms of the theories in 
Chapter 3. Each 'case' (unit of analysis) was one type of provider, by ownership, for a given care 
group (CHS, OOH or hospital, as explained below). 
4.b.i.  Sampling
To compare the different types of provider ownership, we assembled a qualitative sample of case-
study sites, each of which instantiated at least one type of ownership. In the English NHS different 
types of provider ownership are concentrated in specific services and therefore care groups. Chapter
5 gives fuller details but in summary the patterns during the study period were: 
1. Corporate: planned hospital care, especially orthopaedics, ophthalmology, gynaecology, 
cosmetic surgery, treatment centres, community health services. 
2. Proprietary: small, often consultant-owned, private hospitals; single-handed general 
practices. 
3. Partnership: general medical and dental practices; some OOH services. 
4. Co-operative (producer co-operative): OOH services
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5. Not-For-Profit providers focused on similar care groups to the corporations. Charitable 
voluntary providers focused more on specialised community services, mental health 
services. 
6. Public firms (NHS trusts): CHS; large, acute general hospitals; ambulance. UK-style social 
enterprises (variant): CHS. 
We decided not to include hybrid organisations but concentrate on ‘purer’ forms of ownership. 
Coverage of the range of provider types therefore required a sample crossing the above range of 
services and care groups, but to enhance comparability containing as few different care groups as 
possible. As focal services we therefore selected: 
1. Community health services
2. Out-of-hours primary care. 
3. A secondary care speciality. Orthopaedics was the obvious choice but since it had already 
been studied we added ophthalmology. 
The sample was qualitatively representative in that taken together, the study sites instantiated all 
main forms of provider ownership found in the English NHS. Because these services have high 
proportions of older patients with complex or multiple health conditions, we made that our focal 
care group. 
For each focal service we made a purposive sample of CCGs that jointly yielded a maximum-
variety sample of provider types by ownership. Where possible we selected from those CCGs ones 
where we could co-locate more than one case study, i.e. having more than one type of provider for a
given service, so as to help us abstract from differences between local health system contexts when 
it came to comparing providers. Since NHS providers were found everywhere, we initially selected 
study sites by the availability of non-NHS providers beginning with the least common types. A first 
step was therefore to find which non-NHS providers existed and where. As official data were scarce
at the time, we used two methods: 
 1. We extended and updated our existing (2013) database38 on NHS commissioning, from 
which we selected CCGs having low supply side concentration and high spending on private
providers. 
 2. To identify NHS-funded but non NHS-owned providers we manually searched: 
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(a) The NHS Choices list of NHS providers at 
http://www.nhs.uk/servicedirectories/pages/caretrustlisting.aspx#TrD However at the 
time we sampled (February 2015) this list did not include the many mental health or 
acute trusts which (also) provided community health services. 
(b) The NHS Partners’ Network (NHSPN) 
(c) Urgent Health UK 
(d) The National Audit Office (2014) report Out of Hours GP Services in England 
(e) Our contacts with national organisations (e.g. NHS Confederation) and providers. 
(f) Rapportage in the national media (BBC, Times, Guardian, Economist) and professional 
press (Health Services Journal, Pulse etc.)
From these sources we assembled one spreadsheet each for hospitals, CHS and OOH services, 
listing all the NHS-funded but not NHS-owned providers that we found. We categorised each such 
provider into one of the ownership categories listed in Chapter 2 and identified which CCG(s) they 
provided services for. When there was a choice we selected larger rather than smaller non-NHS 
providers in order to study those making the largest contributions to their local health economy. 
That method yielded the following sampling frames for non-NHS providers. 
For planned ophthalmic services we ranked UK private hospitals by the number of NHS-funded in-
patient cases in 2011-12 (the latest data then available). Ten private hospitals had over 1000 such 
cases. To select the currently largest providers we combined the totals for hospitals which at the 
time of sampling, i.e. early 2015, were under the same ownership (though not necessarily so in 
2011-12). Applying the same method to orthopaedics yielded a list of 38 private hospitals with at 
least 1000 NHS-funded cases. Ramsay, Spire and Care UK also owned treatment centres, as did 
seven other smaller corporations. We found no proprietary acute hospitals working under NHS 
contract (as opposed to taking privately-funded patients), nor any hospitals operated by 
cooperatives, partnerships or social enterprises. 
Community health service case numbers were not available so as an indicator of provider size we 
instead used the number of sites (CCGs) in which they held NHS contracts. On that basis there 
were, early in 2015, four corporate providers with multiple NHS contracts, a number of (then) 
single-site CHS providers (e.g. Serco, Nestor) and what appeared to be AQP contract holders for 
services such as diagnostics and certain therapies (e.g. Connect Physiotherapy, In-health). We found
13 social enterprises (all community interest companies) providing CHS. All but one, a referral 
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screening centre which we excluded from the sample, were former NHS Trusts and therefore 
similar in scope and size. There were then four CHS providers owned either by a general practice, a 
group of general practices, or a group of individual GPs. Although there were many voluntary 
providers of community health services working without NHS contracts and many voluntary 
organisations providing NHS mental health services under contract, we could find no voluntary 
organisation which at that time held an NHS contract for CHS. 
Social enterprise, NHS and general practice OOH services were all widely distributed, so again we 
first selected a corporate study site then added providers under other forms of ownership, using so 
far as possible the same criteria and methods as above. Approximately ten percent of general 
practices reportedly still remained responsible for their out-of-hours services 
(http://bma.org.uk/working-for-change/negotiating-for-the-profession/bma-  general-practitioners-  
committee/priorities/out-of-hours-care/background) but these typically discharged the responsibility
by sub-contracting another provider (e.g. deputising service or one of the large OOH providers). 
Despite CQC’s assistance in searching for one, we therefore found no partnership general practices 
that provided their own OOH services independently. The lack of a central database made local 
networks were the only way of identifying general practices that did so, a method that was not 
practicable for us to extent beyond our main case-study areas. Although they had changed their 
legal status, some former cooperatives retained their original ownership and structure after 
becoming nominally ‘social enterprises’ or ‘not-for-profit’ organisations. Lastly we selected where 
possible the main NHS trust providing the same services for the same CCG as the non-NHS 
provider(s). 
4.b.ii.   The resulting sample
Negotiating research access was the most constraining, slow and laborious stage of sample 
selection, especially for NHS hospital trusts but also because of the constant flux of non-NHS 
providers moving in and out of markets, and changing ownership. During these negotiations one 
sampled provider lost its NHS contract and another failed to win won the one that it had been 
confident of gaining. Another selected provider lost part of its NHS contract. A by-product of these 
sampling methods was a profile of the diversity of provision of NHS funded services in February-
March 2015 (Chapter 5). 
Table 2 shows the eventually resulting sample of sites from which we were able to obtain data. 
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Table 2: Study sites sample with case study (CS) numbers. 
Hospital
Orthopaedics
Hospital
Ophthalmology
Community Health
Services
GP Out-of-Hours
Corporate CS1: Corporation
A, (ISTC) 
CS2: Corporation
A, (ISTC)
CS3: Corporation B CS4: Corporation A
Proprietary [One hospital, no access] 
X
CS8: Proprietary D*
Public CS13: Foundation Trust E CS15: Foundation
Trust F
CS16: Ambulance
FoundationTrust G: 
Co-operative
X X X
CS20: Co-operative
H* 
Social 
Enterprise
X X
CS23: Social
Enterprise I
CS24: Social
Enterprise J 
Not-for-profit CS 9 CS 10
X X
Not-for-profit chain C
CS25: Voluntary
hospital K 
X
Professional 
Partnership
X X CS31: Partnership L X
* Changed ownership type during study period: see text. 
In theory the presence of eight forms of ownership and four focal services implied 32 (= 4x8) 
possible combinations of service * ownership, hence 32 case studies if we studied each one 
separately. However not all 32 combinations existed in England. (This incidentally shows the value 
of consulting also the secondary research on other health systems, some of which reports the 
characteristics of  service * ownership combinations which do not at present exist in England.) Grey
cells marked ‘X’ in table 2 indicate those that did not. Also, some of the existing ownership-service 
combinations were rare. We could find only one proprietary hospital providing NHS-funded 
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ophthalmic and orthopaedic services and it did not have the capacity to grant us research access. 
The free-standing voluntary hospital provided mainly orthopaedics services, adding ophthalmology 
only late in the fieldwork period. One of the not-for-profit chain hospitals also provided only 
orthopaedics services. Much NHS-funded secondary care supplied by non-NHS providers is given 
at ISTCs, which we therefore counted as ‘hospital’ care even though it is given on a day-case basis 
(which however NHS trust hospitals also do). Our intended proprietary case-study OOH provider 
converted to corporate ownership before fieldwork started. We nevertheless still included it because
it had changed from co-operative to proprietary to corporate ownership under the same CEO, giving
interesting contrasts of ownership whilst holding constant the setting, main activities and some of 
its senior managers. These changes were recent enough for informants to describe the organisation 
under its previous ownerships. Similarly, the OOH cooperative to which we had access had 
converted to a limited liability, not-for-profit company before fieldwork started. However its board 
was still elected by its GP subscribers who were also the majority of its working members, so 
despite changing its legal personality it remained essentially a cooperative. The social enterprise 
OOH provider had retained cooperative ownership and structure despite changing its legal 
personality. In studying these cases we focused on the form, hence period, of ownership required to 
give range required for our sample. Our sample thus covered all the forms of provider ownership 
then contracted to NHS commissioners, and all the relevant service * ownership combinations 
except for a proprietary hospital. 
 
4.b.iii.  Cases and sites
Sampling where differently-owned providers which served the same local health economies (LHE) 
gave us fewer study sites than case studies (Table 3). 
Table 3: Case studies and Local Health Economies 
Case Study Local Health Economy 
Corporate Hospital Orthopaedics & Ophthalmology (CS1) LHE A
Corporate Hospital Orthopaedics & Ophthalmology (CS2)
Public Firm Hospital Orthopaedics & Ophthalmology (CS13)
Public Firm Community Health Services (CS15)
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Social Enterprise GP out-of-hours (CS24)
Not-for-profit Hospital Orthopaedics (CS9) LHE B
 Partnership Community Health Services (CS31)
Social Enterprise Community Health Services (CS23)
Voluntary Hospital Orthopaedics (CS25) LHE C 
Corporate Community Health Services (CS3)
Corporate GP Out-of-Hours (CS4)
Not-for-profit Hospital Orthopaedics & Ophthalmology (CS10) LHE D 
Public Firm GP Out-of-Hours (CS16) LHE E 
Co-operative GP Out-of-hours (CS20) LHE F 
Ex-Proprietary GP Out-of-hours (CS8) LHE G 
4.b.iv.  Data collection
For each case-study organisation we identified informants by snowballing from a key informant. 
The choice of informants reflected the study design, discussions with the key informant, and 
practical considerations such as availability for interview. Our managerial respondents typically 
included (variously named) hospital directors or chief executives, medical directors, operations 
managers, finance managers, quality and performance managers, service managers and business 
development or marketing managers together with clinical leads in our tracer services, lead nurses 
or matrons and contract managers. Certain further informants had organisation-specific roles such 
as directors of transformation or integrated care, or patient engagement manager. Our 
commissioning respondents varied from senior commissioning or programme officers to contract 
managers, and included a GP clinical lead, finance manager and director of quality and safety. Most 
were CCG officers but some were from a CSU. 
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For the qualitative parts of the research we assembled the data summarised in Table 4. We used a 
semi-structured interview schedule (Appendix 1) as an omnibus questionnaire, selecting at 
interview any points that we particularly wanted to probe in light of what data we already had, any 
ambiguities or contradictions in our data so far, and where possible to check for (hence correct) any 
justification bias when informants described another (e.g. competing) organisation. Guarding 
against that, we included informants’ accounts of how other organisations worked provided that the 
informant was speaking from recent first-hand clinical, managerial or patient experience, and not 
otherwise. Taking the key informants’ advice as to which managerial documents were seminal to 
our research questions, we obtained those documents and content-analysed them. We observed 
provider-commissioner meetings. 
Table 4: Data collected
Interviews Other material 
Organisational case studies 83 212 documents, 226 media reports 
Commissioning meetings 15 Observations (27 hours)
Patients 89 5 focus groups (38 participants), 5 individual 
patients/representatives (one further LHE)
Contextualisation data N/A HES, OPCS 
Secondary data N/A 283 published papers, 34 research reports
The meetings included contract review meetings, clinical quality review meetings and combined 
quality and performance meetings (sometimes more than one per provider). In two cases (one CCG)
no meetings were observed but a senior contract manager was interviewed instead. With the 
interviewees’ consent, interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. We pseudonymised the data 
throughout. 
 
4.b.v.  Analysis
As noted, each 'case' (unit of analysis) was one type of provider (by ownership) for a given service 
(CHS, OOH or hospital speciality). We collated and triangulated all the data obtained from the 
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sources listed in table 4 into a case-study for each organisation. These studies were used, firstly, to 
populate a framework analysis238,239 whose categories reflected our initial analytic framework (hence
previous research: Chapter 3) and our research questions (Chapter 1). The framework analysis was 
conceptually equivalent to a tabulation in which each row was a type of provider ownership and 
each column one of these categories. This method exposed where data were missing, ambiguous or 
seemingly contradictory, prompting further data collection and exposed any disconfirming evidence
and counter-explanations for the theories in Chapter 3. It enabled us to incorporate multiple 
perspectives240 and corroborate assertions, a necessary precaution with such politically-contested 
subject-matter.  When different pieces of evidence appeared contradictory, we sought further 
evidence or interpretation from our informants to resolve the contradiction. 
Soon after data collection began, pairs of the researchers separately coded the same data to check 
whether our coding frames were usable and comprehensive. The researchers reconciled initial 
coding differences by the standard method of making explicit their respective different rationales 
for their initial coding, and then formulating supplementary coding criteria to remove the initial 
ambiguities. These discussions most often concerned the types of ownership and governance 
structure. The initial divergences largely reflected the team members’ different disciplines, hence  
different conceptual repertoires and vocabularies. These discussions had two main outcomes. In 
some cases the researchers decided upon explicit definitions (see Chapter 3) of terms such as 
‘corporate’ to make explicit what this report does, and does not, mean by them. Other discussions 
yielded a more refined understanding of the data, for instance about the distinctions between legal 
personality and ownership, and between nominal and beneficial ownership. 
Data which did not fit into the framework were coded and separately analysed inductively to expose
themes relevant to our research questions but which the researchers had not foreseen. Such data 
from our first fieldwork LHE were trial coded transcripts, coding criteria agreed where the coders 
had initially coded differently, then summarised code by code into new themes which we used, 
where necessary, to supplement, refine and re-define our original analytic framework. Thus 
extended, the framework analysis showed the extent and loci of variation in provider behaviour in 
practice, and the constraints upon that variation and became raw material for the final, synthetic 
stage of analysis (see below). 
4.c.  Studies of patient experience  
Molineuvo et al.42 report the difficulty (across countries) in obtaining internal administrative data 
about quality from private hospitals. Not expecting to be able to obtain on request any such data 
which were commercially confidential or sensitive for other reasons, we therefore collected data on 
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patient experiences directly from patients themselves and secondarily from published sources. We 
interviewed, and ran focus groups of, patients who within the last three months (to reduce recall 
bias) had used the focal services. This work thus included patient and public involvement as a 
research method (involving patients in refining research questions, providing data, advising the 
researchers) and a policy outcome (whether commissioning decisions have become more 
democratically accountable). Because we wanted to trace the effect of ownership, hence 
organisational structure, upon management, working practices and innovation, and then upon 
patients themselves, we conducted this work in the same LHEs, and with the same providers and 
services as the organisational case studies. We also used the same methods as for the organisational 
case studies except for the following details. 
4.c.i.  Sampling
Formal sampling calculations are not relevant to this type of qualitative research. Rather, we 
interviewed patients until data saturation. Ideally we would have identified patients by file-sampling
providers' patient lists but few providers could accommodate that and so as a fall-back we asked 
each case-study provider to approach 30 patients who had all the following characteristics: 
1. Had used our tracer service within the last three months:
2. Aged 65 or over;
3. Not receiving terminal care;
4. Not cognitively impaired;
5. Located within a defined geographical area (to be agreed with the organisation). 
We aimed at a sample of 5-10 patients per case-study LHE. Patients’ response rates to requests for 
interview were generally low. It was harder to recruit patients who had used OOH services than 
those who had used, say, hospital orthopaedics because of the limited contact and anonymity that 
typifies OOH services, and because these services are more marginal to most patients' experience. 
We collected patient data in all the organisational case-study organisations but two. One not-for-
profit hospital and the professional partnership that provided CHS said they were also willing to 
draw a patient sample for us and received the study documentation, but after more than six months 
of chasing up and with the end of the study approaching we had still not received any responses 
from their patients and had to abandon collecting patient data there. 
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4.c.ii.  Data Collection 
Within each case-study LHE we used two methods to obtain data on patients’ qualitative 
experiences of differently-owned healthcare providers. 
4.c.iii.  Focus Groups 
To identify which aspects of choice are important to patients and any sensitivities likely to arise in 
researching them, we first held focus groups of patients and representatives of patient organisations,
exploring through them which aspects of service provision patients would like to have choices 
about; whether they actually had those choices; and how different organisations consulted and/or 
involved patient organisations in decision-making. Because of the ways in which CCGs and other 
organisations tend to organise their PPI and similar activities we conducted focus groups by LHE 
(rather than by provider). The means of accessing users and their organisations, varied by LHE. 
1. For our largest study LHE (LHE A) comprised two STPs. In one we consulted the county 
and two city Health Watch organisations, speaking variously to their volunteer officer, 
community development officer, community engagement officer and diverse communities’ 
officer. Together these informants covered the two (corporate) treatment centres, two NHS 
trusts (one hospital, one CHS), and a social enterprise providing OOH primary medical 
services. In the second STP, the location of our NHS Trust OOH case study, we conducted a 
patient focus group. This group was organised by the Chair of the county 50+ group and 
drew on members from a number of local forums, including many with formal 
representational links to health providers or local government.
2. In our other main study LHE (LHE B) our access was facilitated by the U3A.
3. At LHE G, location of the ex-proprietary OOH provider, we arranged access to patients via 
one of the local senior councils. This focus group was held in a local sheltered housing 
complex. It also included people with local, regional and national representative roles. 
Elsewhere, coverage was not universal but:
4. In LHE C the group was hosted by a village information centre and social action project 
(which supported people on a short term basis by e.g. driving for health appointments and 
hospital visiting) and who recruited participants from amongst their volunteers and users.
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5. In LHE D the community engagement/volunteer coordinator from the city’s Healthwatch 
recruited participants (including some pensioner’s champions) and attended herself. 
With participants’ consent we audio-recorded and transcribed the focus group meetings. 
Where possible we also attended meetings of the patient forums set up by the providers where we 
conducted organisational fieldwork: specifically, an expert patient’s group chaired by the Hospital 
Director at one of the corporate hospitals, an established service user and carer strategic forum run 
by a social enterprise CHS provider in LHE B, and a patient, carer and voluntary sector forum run 
by the former proprietary OOH provider in LHE G. Since patient forums are not focus groups we 
had to attend as observers. The forums did however provide an alternative view of patients' 
preferences with patients acting as advocates, raising issues that mattered to them rather than ones 
suggested by us. Patients did however raise issues about choice spontaneously in the forum 
meetings. Accessing these bodies was one way of reducing the constraint of research participation 
fatigue on the part of patient organisations, which often seemed to be short-staffed and inundated 
with consultation requests. 
In the event our sample contained 89 individual patients interviews and 6 focus groups. The 
patients’ mean age was 74, 90% were white British and 61% female. The youngest group was those 
receiving elective hospital orthopaedics and ophthalmology, the oldest those receiving community 
health services. All patients interviewed from the not-for profit providers received elective 
treatment as inpatients (mostly knee and hip replacements), that at two corporate ISTCs as elective 
outpatients. In contrast many patients interviewed from the NHS Trust had either entered it as 
urgent or emergency cases (e.g. following a fall or fracture) or for planned specialist treatment (e.g. 
corneal graft). An additional advantage of concentrating the research in two main areas was that 
patients were often able to reflect on choice and experience associated with other case-study 
organisations locally too. 
4.c.iv.  Patient Interviews
Patient interviews also used a semi-structured schedule (Appendix 2) which in part reformulated 
relevant parts of the WHO World Health Survey 2002 rotation B – Individual Questionnaire 
( <http://www.who.int/healthinfo/survey/instruments/en/>, <whslongindividuals.pdf> ), Q7100 as 
open questions.  Like other studies241 we found that patients’ recall was often partial. Patients often 
called upon partners, and paper records if available, to substantiate their experience. Many 
interviews for this study were conducted with a partner not only present but actively aiding recall. 
Their help was an important factor shaping these patients’ navigation of the health system. 
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4.c.v.  Initial Analysis
We analysed focus participants' responses by induction from focus group transcripts, pooling data 
across focus groups on the assumption that patients' preferences about choice in a given service are 
independent of provider ownership. We summarised the contents of each transcript as a list of 
themes about what choices patients said they were offered, about which aspects of care, their 
experiences of choice-making, its consequences and their preferences. We then combined these lists
of themes into a single summary for each case study. As with the organisational case studies, we 
carried direct quotations forward (increasingly selectively) at each step. 
To combine these patient data and compare them systematically across provider types, we extended 
the framework analysis used to analyse the organisational data and reported above. To it we added 
further (virtual) columns, each corresponding to a theme derived from the focus groups and patient 
interviews. As for the organisation study, we collated into this framework what data we could, this 
time using the thematic summaries described above. As before, data which did not fit into it were 
coded and separately analysed inductively to summarise the response-patterns not foreseen by the 
researchers. Again, these methods enabled us to incorporate multiple perspectives240 but since 
patients’ experiences, attitudes and preferences may be expected to differ, we did not treat such 
differences as contradictions somehow to be resolved, but simply noted and reported any that did 
occur. 
4.d.  Contextualising the case studies  
4.d.i.  Design
The contextualisation work-package (WP3) aimed to assess whether the case-study LHEs had any 
particular characteristics which might prevent generalisation from findings about them, i.e. any 
environmental factors likely to moderate in atypical ways the structure-process-outcome 
relationships described in Chapter 3. 
An important environmental characteristic was provider competition, whose character differed in 
competitive-bidding and in patient-choice structures. The case-study CHS and OHS providers 
operated in a competitive-bidding environment, where competitive pressures exist only at the time 
of bidding or re-bidding. For providers in patient choice structures, the geographical dispersion of 
providers, might through its implications for travel times confound the extent to which choice of 
provider is practicable for patients. 
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Our focal secondary care services operated within patient-choice structures. We therefore report 
first the contextualising factors that applied to all three focal services (CHS, OOH, hospitals), then 
additional contextual factors that applied only to the hospitals. We compared each case-study LHE 
with others in England in terms of: 
 1. Population size  . This constrains the scope for provider development, cost containment, 
innovation, and for the presence of diverse providers themselves. 
 2. Population Deprivation  . Local differences in population age-sex mix, in particular 
deprivation242 may give rise to differences in population healthcare burden on providers. To 
measure deprivation latter we used the mean Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) score for 
2014/15 for the population served (CCG populations for the non-hospital services, 
population within 30 minutes drive time for secondary care services). 
 3. As a proxy for organisational complexity, understood in terms of the exent of the referral 
networks243 and inter-organisational care coordination that a provider is involved with, we 
compared the number of CCGs (for hospitals) or general practices (for CHS and OOH 
providers) that each provider was involved with.
Appendix 3 gives fuller details. 
For the case-study hospitals, a patient-choice quasi-market, additional possible moderating 
(confounding) factors were: 
 1. Whether other hospitals (of any ownership) exist in the locality, hence the possibility of 
contestation or competition (see above) between, say, publicly-owned hospitals. We 
therefore compared our case-study hospitals in terms of their local (30-minute drive-time) 
market share, number of other non-NHS providers for the same care group, and Hirschman-
Herfindahl Index (HHI)244, a standard measure of market concentration. 
 2. As a proxy for the likely presence of private payers we again used IMD scores, on the 
assumption that the less deprived a population is, the greater the proportion of it that has 
health insurance or can pay out-of-pocket. 
 3. How geographically dispersed their patients were, measured by drive time, which might 
constrain a hospital’s scope for innovation (e.g. use of day-case treatments). 
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 4. How likely individual patients were to be able to travel to an alternative (competing) 
hospital. 
 5. Mean age of patients, on the assumption that older patients tend to require more intensive 
treatment which again might constrain a hospital’s scope for adopting such innovations as 
day-case treatment. 
Again, appendix 3 gives fuller details. 
4.d.ii.  Data collection
For hospital services we obtained the latest HES data available (i.e. 2014-15) for the HRG, ICD10 
and OPCS Classification of Interventions and Procedures (OPCS-4) categories corresponding to our
focus on orthopaedics and ophthalmology. Our orthopaedic record-level dataset comprised elective 
admissions (admimeth=11,12 or 13) for any provider with an ICD10 diagnosis code M00-M99 or 
Q65-Q79 or a OPCS-4 procedure code O06-10, O17-O19, O21-O27, O29, O32, V01-V68, W01-
W99 or X19-X27. We extracted subset datasets relating to hip and knee arthroplasties 
(replacements) with OPCS-4 codes as defined by the National Joint Registry (OPCS Codes relevant
to procedures recorded on the NJR, Version 4, November 2016, http://bit.ly/2tfHwlo  ).   Our 
ophthalmic record-level dataset comprised elective admissions for any provider with an ICD10 
diagnosis code H00-H59 or Q10-Q15 or a OPCS-4 procedure code C00-C90. We extracted a subset 
dataset for cataract operations with OPCS-4 codes C71-75 or C77. HES data include information on
the Lower Super Output Area (LSOA) of patients’ residence, allowing us to calculate individual 
patient travel times, using OpenStreetMap routing data (Project OSRM; https://github.com/Project-
OSRM). The OpenStreetMap data also allowed us to define catchment areas in terms of a 30-
minute travel time to each provider. Linking LSOA data to IMD2015 and 2011 census data then 
allowed us to profile the characteristics of the patients attending each provider and the 
characteristics of each provider’s local catchment population. 
Announcements in 2014 notwithstanding, equivalent data were not available for CHS and OOH 
providers. The monitoring of OOH service provision seemed somewhat haphazard during the study 
period, having apparently been tendered out in 2006 and OOH providers are not obliged to report to
the organisation that let the tender. For OOH and CHS providers, therefore, we could not detail the 
characteristics of the recipients of services, but their effective catchment areas could be defined in 
terms of CCGs, Local Authorities (LAs), Middle Layer Super Output Areas (MSOAs), LSOAs and, 
for OOH providers in particular, their constituent General Practices. Linking the geographic data to 
IMD2015 and 2011 census data allowed us to describe the characteristics of each provider’s 
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catchment area, whilst linking GPs with Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) data allowed us 
to describe the health status of each provider’s catchment population in terms of the prevalence of 
Coronary Heart Disease (CHD), hypertension, diabetes, Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease 
(COPD) and cancer. 
4.d.iii.  Data analysis
We therefore made a cross-sectional comparison describing a range of 2011 Census characteristics 
(demography, National Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-SeC), general health status, 
ethnicity and tenure) and the IMD2015 profile (and population-weighted mean) for each provider 
catchment population and, for HO&O providers only, characteristics of each provider’s patient 
cohort for 
1. all elective orthopaedic procedures, 
2. all elective ophthalmic procedures, 
3. elective hip arthroplasties (using National Joint Registry OPCS Codes relevant to primary 
hip procedures; http://bit.ly/2tfHwlo), 
4. elective knee arthroplasties (using National Joint Registry OPCS Codes relevant to primary 
knee procedures; http://bit.ly/2tfHwlo), and 
5. elective cataract operations (OPCS-4: C71-75 & C77). 
The 2011 Census and IMD2015 characteristics of provider populations are compared to national 
averages, and those of the orthopaedics and ophthalmic patient cohorts with those for all providers 
of the relevant procedures. In addition we compared the QOF prevalence of a range of conditions 
(CHD, hypertension, diabetes, COPD and cancer) for GPs served by the case-study OOH and CHS 
providers against prevalence rates for all GPs in England. We also compared the number of CCGs 
commissioning each case-study hospital, and its case mix in terms of social deprivation, showing 
whether that provided served a greater proportion of residents from the less-deprived localities 
surrounding than other nearby providers did, or than the averages for England as a whole. Once 
again appendix 3 gives fuller details. 
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4.e.  Synthesising the findings  
4.e.i.  Provider ownership profiles
By collating findings from the organisational and patient experience work-packages we assembled a
behavioural profile for each provider type i.e. an empirical summary of what behaviours appeared 
characteristic, according to our data, of foundation trusts, of corporate providers, social enterprises 
etc. Comparing these profiles shows the loci of variation in provider behaviour regarding the policy 
outcomes on which our research questions (Chapter 1) and initial explanatory schema (Chapter 3) 
focussed. Using the quantitative findings we considered the ways in which these profiles might 
reflect local contexts rather than provider ownership, so that if necessary we could qualify our 
findings accordingly. Within the limitations of the data available to us, these methods yielded an 
empirical ‘ideal type’, representing the typical characteristics245 and consequences of each type of 
provider ownership. 
In presenting our findings (Chapters 5-10) we combine the (largely similar) findings for planned 
orthopaedics and planned ophthalmic services in each case-study organisation. We also combined 
our own fieldwork with secondary research findings. 
4.e.ii.  Generalisability
The methods reported above allow two ways of evaluating whether the case-study findings are 
generalisable. Qualitative generalisation assumes that the same kinds of organisational structures 
(ownership, management) and productive processes will, in similar settings, produce similar effects.
In collecting and analysing the case-study data we therefore made a point of seeking any evidence 
that the study organisations were atypical: 
1. Of organisations under that kind of ownership (i.e. was this particular corporation in any 
important ways atypical of other corporations?; and so on); 
2. In their care processes (‘technologies’); 
3. In their ‘inner’ local environment (e.g. any unusual characteristics of the local population or 
the set of providers serving it). 
Following realist practice, we deliberately looked for any factors that might confound the 
relationships between ownership, management, care process, and policy outcomes for 
commissioners and patients, to take these into account when trying to form from our case studies an
ideal-type profile of a corporate (or public, or cooperative ...etc.) provider. The more similar to the 
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rest of England were our study LHE environments and, for each case-study organisation, 
organisations under that kind of ownership, the more confident can we be that the study findings  
generalise across England. 
The contextualisation study provided evaluated whether our study LHEs were atypical in 
quantifiable ways (e.g. size, case-mix, location, socio-economic setting) that might confound the 
relationships between ownership, management, care process, and policy outcomes for 
commissioners and patients. 
4.f.  Deriving practical implications  
Findings from realist research standardly take the form of statements that doing X (for example 
commissioning voluntary organisations to provide services) under circumstances C (continuing the 
example, the voluntary organisations can recruit volunteers, patients are willing to use them etc.) 
will probably produce outcome Y (for the same example, introducing (say) new forms of hospice 
care). Without any loss or addition of content, such findings are easily reformulated as hypothetical 
imperatives: in this case, ‘If you wish to introduce (say) new forms of hospice care, then in settings 
which have sufficient volunteers and suitable patients, commissioning the relevant voluntary 
providers is likely to achieve that aim’. The imperative is ‘hypothetical’ because it applies only if 
one chooses the corresponding policy outcome. Whilst it states that the intervention in question 
(say, commissioning voluntary providers) is probably sufficient to achieve that outcome, it does not 
imply that the proposed intervention is the only, still less the best, way to do so. An evidence-based 
hypothetical imperative is also always corrigible by new evidence. With those provisos, the realist 
methodology used in this study can yield evidence-based practical implications. 
4.g.  Research governance  
4.g.i.  Patient and public involvement 
Patient and public involvement in this study was relatively limited, focusing upon patients’ roles as 
key informants rather than as participants in the managements of the study. Within those limits, 
patient and public involvement in the research was achieved by three complementary means.
As explained above, we arranged focus groups to discover patient and carer views about: which 
aspects of service provision people would like to have choice about; whether they actually had 
those choices; how different organisations consulted or involved patient organisations in decision-
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making; and whether there were any aspects of patient choice that they thought patients might be 
sensitive about discussing with the researchers. In this way patient and public involvement was used
as: a research method (involving patients and their representatives in refining research questions, 
providing data and advising the researchers); as a source of research findings (about how choice 
operates and whether commissioning decisions have become more transparent and accountable) and
as guide to analysis (informing our analytic framework). 
In some of our case-study organisations we observed patient forums. This offered us the opportunity
directly to observe patient-provider interaction, including some providers’ responses to patients’ 
concerns. It also gave patients (as with the focus groups) an opportunity to question us directly 
about the research.
As already described, we interviewed patient in the same LHEs, providers and services as the 
organisational case studies. This enabled us to trace the effects working practices and innovation, 
hence those of ownership, organisational structure, and management, upon patients themselves. We 
again focused on patients aged 65 and over who had recently used the particular tracer service under
study in each provider. Once the case-study organisation had sent details of our research to patients 
who met our study criteria, interested patients dealt with us directly, with no further provider 
involvement. These interviews helped populate our analytic framework and suggested new 
emergent themes to supplement, refine and re-define our initial (Chapter 3) theories. 
Throughout we met the participants' costs of participation (e.g. travel costs etc.) and paid them an 
honorarium. Focus group participants and interviewees were both concerned to contribute to policy 
relevant research (hoping their experience could be useful) and keen to hear of our findings. 
4.g.ii.  Equality and diversity
One aspect of the research was to examine whether different providers of different ownership tend 
to gravitate towards different kinds of population catchment areas. Specifically, we were interested 
in whether corporate and not-for-profit providers tended to concentrate near wealthier populations, 
hence whether the supposed benefits (if in fact found) for NHS patients of using these providers 
were more accessible to those than to other populations. We also compared the CCGs 
commissioning each case-study organisation in terms of social deprivation, showing whether that 
provider served a greater proportion of residents from the less-deprived localities surrounding than 
other nearby providers did, or than the averages for England as a whole. Results of this work are in 
Chapter 11 section (a)iii and Appendix 3. 
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4.g.iii.  Ethics
The NHS REC system approved the study (reference 10/H0206/71), subject to informant anonymity
and obtaining research governance approval from each NHS organisation involved, which we did. 
University of Plymouth ethical approval was obtained for non-NHS sites. In compliance with the 
ethical approvals all informants and study sites are pseudonymised in the following Chapters, 
including (for consistency) those who waived their right to anonymity. We obtained permission 
(reference DARS-NIC-15504-X5K0H) to access the relevant HES admissions and case-mix data 
for our case-study organisations. 
73
Chapter 5.  ‘Outer’ environment: the diverse provider landscape
• An increasing share of NHS spending has been on non-NHS providers 
• The largest increase has been in community health services, partly due to NHS trusts 
converting to social enterprises 
• The non-NHS provider side of the quasi-market has been very unstable with many entrants, 
exits, mergers and take-overs 
• There has been a trend towards more corporate and financialised ownership 
Policy-makers have wished to see competition between more diverse providers in the NHS quasi-
market (Chapter 2). An important feature of each provider’s environment was therefore which other
providers existed or were likely to enter or leave it. We therefore used the methods reported in 
Chapter 4 to find which non-NHS providers existed and where. Because of the confidentially which
sometimes surrounds the ownership of non-NHS providers and changes in it, because not all such 
changes are publicly reported, and because those which are reported are not always easy to find, this
chapter probably errs towards under-reporting such matters. 
Overall some £10 billion of the total NHS budget of £113 billion was spent on non-NHS providers 
in 2013-14.48 During and immediately before the study period the population of non-NHS owned 
organisations, other than professional partnership general practices, providing NHS-funded services
was complex and constantly changing. For our focal services the main patterns were as follows. 
5.a.  The scale and nature of diverse provision  
5.a.i.  Hospitals 
Non-NHS hospitals continue (as since the 1990s) to concentrate on planned acute treatments in a 
few specialities (orthopaedics, ophthalmology, gynaecology, general surgery88; cosmetic surgery, 
termination of pregnancy). Private (mostly corporate) hospitals now do some 20% of NHS-funded 
hip and knee replacements.246 NHS commissioners also contract private providers ad hoc, often for 
rather marginal services.44 Proprietary hospitals play a trifling role compared with the corporate 
chains (not the case in the 1980s). Against this, some, but not all, former ISTCs have closed or been
absorbed into the NHS, at least two for quality and safety reasons.83,247 We found only one voluntary
hospital of comparable size to a corporate hospital, and no hospitals owned by social enterprises, 
cooperatives or professional partnerships. 
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For orthopaedics we found in early 2015 that 38 private hospitals had taken at least 1000 NHS-
funded cases in 2011-21 (the latest data then available). Grouped by owner and in descending order 
of caseload they were: 
1. Care UK: 8 hospitals, 25466 cases. 
2. Ramsay: 14 hospitals, 25072 cases. 
3. Spire: 4 hospitals, 6203 cases. 
4. BMI: 4 hospitals, 4711 cases. 
5. Horder Healthcare: 1 hospital, 4613 cases. 
6. Nuffield: 3 hospitals, 4515 cases. 
7. Nations Healthcare: 1 hospital, 2091 cases. 
8. Circle: 1 hospital, 1391 cases. 
9. Aspen: 1 hospital, 1097 cases. 
10. Spencer Private Hospitals, 1007 cases. 
Similarly for ophthalmology in early 2015, nine corporate hospitals had over 1000 NHS-funded in-
patient cases. Again grouped by owner they were: 
1. Care UK (including UK Specialist Hospitals, which Care UK took over in 2013): 6 
hospitals, 10,221 cases. 
2. Ramsay: 2 hospitals, 2617 cases. 
3. One Nuffield Health hospital had 1105 cases. 
NHS commissioners also contracted private providers ad hoc, often for rather marginal services.44 
Nuffield’s not-for-profit hospitals – that largest group of that kind - had an annual turnover of £767 
million in 2015248 compared with £117,229 million for the English NHS.249 
Conversely, in 2014-15 NHS trusts obtained a mean of 1.2% of their income from private patients 
(mostly small private patients units) but around ten tertiary care trusts, mostly in London,  
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considerably more250, the highest being 22% (https://nhsprivate.wordpress.com/, 19th January 2016).
Some NHS Trusts have created a charity to own and operate services for private patients, others a 
separate company limited by guarantee. Either way, one reported effect 
(https://nhsprivate.wordpress.com/ 19th January 2016) was to circumvent the requirements for 
reporting in the Trust's 'Section 44 Declaration' and therefore the limit on, non-NHS income. The 
largest took 2230 NHS-funded in-patient orthopaedic cases in 2011-12, making it the third-largest 
commercial provider of such work. Pressure on NHS funding apparently made such activity more 
financially attractive to NHS Trusts. Collaborations between NHS trusts and corporations have also 
been established, a recent (early 2017) example being for the Hospital Corporation of America 
(HCA) to lease four floors of a new cancer unit at Guy’s and St Thomas’ Foundation Trust.251.The 
Christie Hospital in Manchester also has a joint venture with HCA. 
5.a.ii.  Community health services 
Community health services have recently had the fastest increase and widest variety of non-NHS 
providers. An estimated 31% of the £9.7bn NHS funding of CHS in England in 2012-13 was paid to
non-NHS providers252 although much of this went to former NHS trusts that had converted to social 
enterprises.48 By 2016, 47% of contracts by value went to non-NHS providers, i.e. ‘private firms’ (a 
category which in that study253 lumps together several different, but not all, types of ‘private’ 
ownership), general practices, not-for-profit organisations, voluntary organisations (‘charities’) and 
‘others’ (in that study an enormous category containing local authorities, social enterprises and 
other community interest companies).253 However the ‘private providers’ mostly had small 
contracts: a 39% share by number but only 5% of the total by value.253 Re-ablement services 
continued to be obtained mostly from non-NHS providers, as did around 20% of mental health 
services.70 Local authorities provided around 5% of NHS-funded mental health services. The main 
corporate providers were Care UK, Primecare (Nestor), Nationwide, BUPA and especially Virgin, 
which during the study period gained a number of multi-million pound contracts. We also found 
four CHS providers, besides our CS31, whose owners included GPs. Nevertheless there remained 
activities with almost no corporate or proprietary providers, in particular the Vanguard projects. (An
American ACO is involved in one vanguard scheme, a high-street pharmacy in one other.254) 
5.a.iii.  Our-of-hours primary medical care 
Since 2004 many OOH cooperatives have converted to social enterprises (e.g. Community Interest 
Company) which, Urgent Health UK claims, now deliver care to nearly 50 per cent of the 
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population, although as shown below this change is often more one of legal status than a substantive
change in organisational structure, de facto ownership and control. In particular, some pre-2004 
cooperatives remain operational, having changed in legal personality but not in ownership or 
control. Others have de-mutualised and become larger as a result of competitive tendering 
pressures.61 About 48% of OOH care is provided by ‘commercial’ (i.e. neither NHS nor social 
enterprise) providers255, above all Care UK and Virgin. The NHS Direct helpline is being outsourced
to private bidders.30 There remain a few large and growing proprietary primary care providers (e.g. 
AT Medics256), and Virgin has also been taking over general practices.257 Nearly all the ‘limited 
companies’ providing primary care have APMS contracts, and in 2012 they represented about 45% 
of APMS contractors .258 A counter-tendency has been an increasing proportion (over 24%) of GPs 
leaving partnership status in favour or employment by foundation trusts (e.g. through a 
subsidiary259), GP federations or the new models of care noted in Chapter 2. 
5.b.  Patterns and trends  
5.b.i.  Entrants
The foregoing suggests three main patterns of entrant to the NHS quasi-market: 
1. Marginal-income-seekers, established healthcare providers already privately financed (e.g. 
by insurers, out-of-pocket payers, donors) but wishing to supplement their income with 
NHS contracts. 
2. Incoming bidders from outside the health sector who saw opportunities for diversification as
NHS contracting was opened up. These included non-health corporations such as Virgin and 
bidders from overseas health systems as United Health Group (which later renamed its 
European operations ‘United Health Europe’). Across England, general practice support 
services were outsourced to Capita in 2015. 
3. Policy-inspired independent providers of NHS-funded services, whether created from 
scratch (e.g. the Independent Sector Treatment Centres, later renamed just as ‘Treatment 
Centres’) or NHS trusts ‘spun off’ as ‘social enterprises’. 
Correspondingly the contribution which NHS funding made to these providers’ income varied 
widely from almost 100% (ISTCs, competitively-tendered services such as Virgin CHS) to a small 
marginal contribution. 
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Many voluntary providers were serving CHS care groups (Dementia, Alzheimers, Autism, in past 
years HIV-AIDS, hospices) who in the voluntary providers’ view the NHS had either under-served 
or offered unsuitable services. Most media mentions of charitable providers were related to specific 
projects rather than broad-spectrum service provision. They were usually very local and often 
initiative-specific. Age UK was widely active e.g. in Northampton and Brighton, in Cornwall is part
of the Integrated Care Pioneer, and as a joint-bidder in Vanguard projects.254 
5.b.ii.  Exits
In 2014 Serco announced its withdrawal from the NHS contracts after making multimillion pound 
losses. Peninsula CIC (a social enterprise) withdrew from CHS because it could not provide the 
demanded services within the price offered. Similarly, corporate primary care providers such as The
Practice and Vida have handed back unprofitable contracts.260,261 Circle relinquished its 
management-only contract for Hinchingbrook Hospital in 2015 because it had been unable to make 
the savings promised.262 Southern Cross went out of business in 2011, due to having sold the leases 
on its care homes to external landlords. NHS Direct collapsed in at least three counties. Some 
corporations withdrew from CHS bids once the financial or other implications became apparent. 
BUPA did not take up an musculoskeletal services (MSK) contract it won in West Sussex because  
‘we cannot deliver the model we proposed without either compromising on the quality of care or 
destabilising other services’ (referring to the local NHS hospital trust).263 Capita and Circle among 
others initially expressed an interest in bidding for CHS services in Cambridgeshire and 
Peterborough but withdrew because of ‘the steep financial efficiencies required’. For reasons which 
they have not stated publicly Ramsay withdrew from building a private hospital jointly with an 
NHS trust in Cambridge.264 
CCGs' use of Any Qualified Provider contracts also appears to have stagnated since 2013 at about 
130 registered providers, usually small to medium sized firms and proprietors.265 Median contract 
size was £318,000, and contracts were predominantly for ‘marginal’ services such as audiology, 
non-obstetric ultrasound, podiatry, MRI scans, eye care, and back and neck pain. By 2014 only a 
minority of CCGs appeared to have any plans to extend the scheme.266 
5.b.iii.  Market behaviour 
Chapter 3 cited studies (mostly American) examining whether corporations are liable to ‘skim’ and 
‘dump’ patients in order to have a profitable case-mix. We found only a few such reports about UK 
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hospitals. In an earlier period, BUPA was alleged267 to have offered some categories of cancer, 
cardiology and gynaecology patients a cash payment to seek treatment at NHS rather than BUPA 
hospitals. At the time of writing (early 2017) the Competition Commission was seeking fresh 
evidence and submissions for a report which described benefits and incentive schemes which 
private hospital operators allegedly provided to referring clinicians. There has also been a growth of
private screening services, with the apparent effect of raising demand for NHS general practice 
services268, and reportedly269 of small private hospitals registering patients with GPs rather than 
using consultants. 
Occasional instances of ‘hard-ball’ competitive behaviour have been reported. Both corporate 
providers and NHS trusts initiated court cases respectively to compel270 or forbid271 CCGs to 
consider bids from corporate providers. In primary medical care 'bad behaviour' could happen 
between competitors 
'especially where they were based in the same building. In Site 1 there were allegations by 
APPCs that other practices had removed signage and misdirected patients. In Site 2 there 
were suggestions that staff at a minor injuries service which shared premises with an APPC 
practice had deliberately misdirected patients away from the APPC.' (62, p.6). 
Doctors' everyday work-practices within the APMS contractors did not appear to differ much from 
those in traditional professional-partnerships in terms of the division of clinical labour and focus on 
meeting QOF targets.62 Since about two-thirds of the cost of healthcare is labour, reducing the use 
of expensive labour i.e. that of clinicians, especially doctors, is therefore the remaining way of 
reducing costs (hence extracting profits) once the price of a contract is determined. This may 
explain the pattern of low staffing levels in some corporate and proprietary providers, of which 
Serco's out-of-hours service in Cornwall was the most publicised example.118,174 Similar accusations 
have been made about Capita272 (but also about some NHS providers). 
5.b.iv.  Financialisation
Non-NHS hospitals had two main forms of ownership. Equity partnerships ('venture capitalists') 
own at least the majority of Circle, Aspen, Care UK (c.20% of which is owned by ‘managers and 
staff’, but mostly by three managers), Allied Health Care (owned by Acromas, which in turn is co-
owned by private equity firms Charterhouse, CVC and Permira) and Spire (owned by Cinven). 
Private equity firms also have (together) a large minority (49.9%) shareholding in the General 
Healthcare Group (GHG: owners of BMI). Stock market listed providers include Care UK, BMI 
(originally part of American Medical International but now owned by GHG, itself majority owned 
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by Netcare RSA), HCA (UK branch of Hospital Corporation of America), Ramsay Healthcare (UK 
branch of Australian Ramsay Health Care Australia), Serco PLC (1987 management buyout from 
Radio Corporation of America) and Clinicentre Ltd. (owned by Carillion). HCA is a private 
company (owned neither by an equity company nor with publicly traded shares). 
We found a tendency for corporate providers to divide themselves into an operating and a property 
company. In 2013 Cinven sold then leased back Spire's hospitals. Circle and BMI are both so 
divided. BMI consists of BMI OpCo and GHG PropCo. GHG Propco then consists of GHG Propco 
1 and GHG Propco 2. Circle consists of two companies: Circle Partnership as operating company 
and Circle Holdings as a financial company, to which Circle Partnership pays 7% interest on loans 
for capital, including working capital. Health Properties, a Jersey company, finances further hospital
acquisitions. Circle and BMI take high-interest loans from companies owned by their parent 
companies. Insofar as interest on these loans pushes the provider company into a nett loss, it can 
receive tax credits on account of that loss. Debts are also secured against the property companies. 
Southern Cross had also in effect separated its property holdings from its remaining role as 
essentially an operating company. These arrangements have been conceptualised120,273 as 
‘financialised’ organisational structures.
5.b.v.  Churn and concentration
In combination, cost containment, provider exits and mergers had four effects: ‘churn’ in non-NHS 
provision; concentration of ownership; de-concentration of hospital services; and corporatisation. 
In the hospital sector, provider ‘churn’ had two main elements: 
1. Instability in what non-NHS provision NHS commissioners purchased; 
and 
2. Reduction of the range of hospital ownership. 
The first was numerically more important. Changes at the volume of NHS-funded work at particular
hospitals had larger consequences for the overall number of NHS-funded episodes at independent 
hospitals than changes in ownership did. Overall, the number of NHS episodes being undertaken by
independent providers rose sharply: 16.0% year-on-year between 2011/12 and 2012/13, 18.4% 
between 2012/13 and 2013/14, and a still more spectacular 33.7% between 2013/14 and 2014/15. 
But not all providers increased their NHS-funded caseload. Many were either stable or declined, as 
figure 1 illustrates. 
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Figure 1: Instability of NHS-funded case-load for non-NHS secondary care providers 
‘Churn’ in non-NHS provider ownership continued before and during the study period. Care UK 
formed in 1982 (under another name), acquiring between then and 2015 at least six other service 
providers before being bought by a private equity group. Aspen Healthcare was a management 
buyout from Paracelsus Kliniken Deutschland GmbH, then merged with Welsh, Carson, Anderson 
and Stowe, a venture capital firm. BMI acquired three Abbey Hospitals in 2010. Ramsay acquired 
Capio UK and its hospitals, day surgery providers and two neurological rehabilitation homes 
(2007). Cinven acquired BUPA Hospitals (2007), and subsequently others, to form Spire. Care UK 
subsequently bought out LiveHealthcare, a South African company running treatment centres, and 
the Mercury Heath ISTCs. to form Spire. Outside our focal care groups, though still relevant to 
OOH services, and as further evidence of ownership ‘churn’, The Practice took GP surgeries from 
Chilvers McCrea and United Health Europe. Virgin acquired and re-named Assura Medical 2010, 
Care UK acquired Harmoni 2012 and a large number of care homes. Small numbers of professional 
partnership general practices have been taken over by NHS trusts, in effect nationalised. Besides the
exits from the NHS quasi-market reported above, The Practice and Vida withdrew from a number of
general practices. Circle relinquished its management-only contract for Hinchingbroke Hospital in 
2014. Southern Cross went out of business in 2011, due to having sold the leases on its care homes 
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to external landlords. NHS Direct collapsed in at least three counties. All four cases about NHS 
procurement and conduct that reached the Cooperation and Competition Panel during 2009-13 came
from non-NHS organisations, as was one of the two complaints to Monitor about NHS 
commissioning during 2013-15.53 Nuffield Health acquired 35 Virgin Active clubs in 2016. 
‘Following Brait’s [an investment company] acquisition of a majority stake in the company, Virgin 
Active’s strategy has been built around a focus on operating and developing prime sites in 
metropolitan hubs in its key geographies.’ (https://www.virginactive.com/latest-news/virgin-active-
today-announces-the-sale-of-35-uk-clubs, accessed 23rd April 2017). BUPA acquired the Oasis 
dental chain in 2016. Against the trend, small but growing numbers of professional partnership 
general practices have been taken over by NHS trusts, in effect nationalised. 
The nett effect has been to concentrate ownership among non-NHS providers, of whom seven now 
take 88% of NHS-funding of non-NHS providers’ inpatient work.46 Gershlick and Firth253 suggest 
that in 2016 there was little concentration among ‘private’ CHS providers (whom they define as 
excluding local authorities, social enterprises and general practices) because the former had (their 
figures imply) a mean of 2.6 contracts each. However the same data also suggest a strongly bi-
modal distribution. Just 8% of ‘private’ CHS providers had NHS contracts worth over £1 million 
(compared with 32% of NHS providers) whilst 59% of private providers held NHS contracts whose 
combined worth for each of them was below £100,000, implying that the value of the biggest 8% 
exceeded that of the smallest 59%. 
Whilst this concentration of ownership reduced NHS-funded patients’ choice of supplier, it did not 
in the hospital sector necessarily reduce their choice of place of treatment. In local health 
economies there was, over time, an increased number of provider sites, hence less geographical 
concentration of activity. A case in point (and a pattern replicated across the country) is in the south 
west where, using STP areas as proxy ‘health economy areas’, there was a notable reduction in 
market concentration scores (HHI) between 2008/09 and 2014/15 (at least with respect to hip 
arthroplasties). There were different – sometimes even erratic - patterns in different STP areas (as 
figure 2 illustrates) but the overall collapse in HHI scores is evident. 
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Figure 2: Non-NHS provision of NHS-funded hip arthroplasties in the South West, 2008 
– 15: Scale and Market Concentration
So, paradoxically, concentration (i.e. less diversity) of ownership occurred alongside de-
concentration of local NHS quasi-markets for secondary care, in the sense of more non-NHS 
hospitals becoming available to NHS-funded patients. That would suggest wider scope for patient 
choice of hos
5.b.vi.  Corporatisation
There has been a limited corporatisation of non-corporate providers, but not the reverse. As the 
more expansive GP-owned companies (e.g. Chilvers McCrea Healthcare, DMC Healthcare, 
Medvivo) began winning NHS contracts outside their local area they became large – perhaps too 
large - for a proprietary structure. Medvivo was bought by a venture capital firm. GP support 
services (e.g. medical record transfers) were outsourced to Capita. Acromas, co-owned by private 
equity firms Charterhouse, CVC and Permir, took over Allied Healthcare, which itself took over the
Sue Ryder charity’s and Nestor Primecare’s domiciliary care. Thamesdoc, originally a co-operative, 
was aquired by Harmoni, then Harmoni by Care UK. Once on the stock market, Care UK was 
acquired by Bridgepoint, a private equity group. With the concentration of ownership described 
above, these findings suggest a trend towards large, more ‘financialised’120 corporations absorbing, 
or through competitive bidding supplanting, providers under other forms of ownership. In 2014, 
corporations made up 59% of the private providers contracted to CCGs, and of those, 58% were 
backed or owned by a private equity firm.39 
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5.c.  Summary   
The share of NHS spending on non-NHS providers grew consistently over the last five years. 
However, market entry by non-NHS providers has mainly been for services with low entry costs 
(day surgery, CHS and OOH) rather than complex in-patient care. Partly this change represents the 
conversion of some NHS trusts to social enterprises. There was considerable ‘churn’ among non-
NHS providers, with two main elements: 
1. In the hospital sector, unstable volumes and case-mix of non-NHS funded workloads. 
2. In all sectors, a constant ‘churn’ of entries, exists, mergers, acquisitions and re-acquisitions 
among the non-NHS providers. 
In CHS especially, a polarised market structure emerged with many small and a few large, dominant
non-NHS suppliers. These findings suggest an empirical pattern that in an environment with mixed 
public and private payers, non-NHS providers tend to converge upon having larger, fewer, more 
predominantly corporate and financialised structures. Paradoxically, concentration (i.e. less 
diversity) of ownership occurred alongside de-concentration of local NHS quasi-markets for 
secondary care, in the sense of more non-NHS hospitals becoming available to NHS-funded 
patients. In themselves however those trends imply neither convergence nor divergence of working 
practices between non-NHS and NHS-owned providers. 
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Chapter 6.  ‘Inner’ environments - constraining diversity away? 
• Regulations and quality standards tended to encourage broadly convergent behaviour among
differently-owned providers. 
• NHS budget restriction limited the diversification of provider ownership, especially the 
expansion of corporate provision. 
• Some but not all providers had substantial private besides NHS income.
• The same providers would often simultaneously collaborate in some respects and compete in
others (‘co-opetition’). 
An organisation’s environment influences that organisation’s behaviour, but the organisation’s 
ownership determines which aspects of its ‘environment’ do so the most, as Chapter 3 discussed. 
Even when provider ownership is diverse, these environmental constraints may however so 
constrain diverse healthcare providers’ behaviour as to produce convergent patterns of innovation, 
responsiveness to commissioners and patient experience. Conversely, diverse providers’ behaviour 
may diverge partly because, in effect, they work within different quasi-market environments. We 
therefore start our findings by reporting on these points, for our case-study organisations. 
Here and in subsequent chapters we present our findings thematically, combining the (in the event 
largely similar) findings for planned orthopaedics and planned ophthalmic services in each hospital.
In labelling the direct quotes from informants, we use the first number to identify the case-study 
(CS), hence provider type - see Table 2, Chapter 4; the next letter identifies the type of informant 
(Manager, Commissioner, Patient, FP Focus Groups Participant) and the following number the 
individual respondent. 
6.a.  Cost control and STPs  
Restrictions on CCG budgets and falling HRG tariffs affected all the case-study organisations. The 
largest hospital in this study (NHS trust, CS13) had to deliver a £33 million ‘Cost Improvement 
Programme’: 
‘a very big drive … through next year to break even, to get the extra cash that you need from
the government.’ (CS13/M47). 
Similarly for HRG tariffs; 
85
‘they introduced an over performance rate at 70%, so basically we’ve got to pay for 
everything at 70% over a [pre-defined] level [of activity]. Well, that level wasn’t the year 
before’s outturn, it was the year before’s plan.’ (CS13/M44). 
The CHS Trust (CS15) had already seen its income reduced by 10% over the preceding five years. 
It had been predicted (National Health Executive 16th December 2015) that HRG tariff reductions 
would reduce the income of the (mainly corporate) private providers of orthopaedics services by 7%
in 2016-17. 
6.a.i.  Cost control
Consequently the innovations that CCGs would fund tended to focus cost containment rather than 
expansion (see Chapter 8), tending to reduce differences in innovation between differently-owned 
providers. At one of the corporate hospitals (CS1) the introduction of a list of procedures of limited 
clinical value (PLCV, e.g. certain cataract extractions, certain physiotherapy, cosmetic surgery) 
reduced the range of activities. The partnership community health services (CHS) provider (CS31) 
said that financial difficulties made the CCG risk-averse and 
‘not that outward looking’ (CS31/M55) 
which restricted the commissioning of new kinds of services. Conversely, the commissioner for the 
NHS trust out-of-hours (OOH) service (CS16) was under less financial pressure than many others 
in its region which made a 
‘big difference’ (CS16/M03), 
allowing commissioners to look at things differently: moving beyond the commissioning of 
individual services to engaging with providers, partners and patients and trying to shape national 
policy. Rising indemnity costs hindered greater GP involvement in OOH services. However the 
OOH co-operative had during our fieldwork assumed responsibility for its members’ indemnity 
insurance. The ex-proprietary and corporate OOH providers were also exploring this option but so 
far offered it to their directly employed nurse practitioners and their one directly employed doctor, 
who explained 
‘The big bonus for me is [corporation] do reimburse my indemnity, which is massive, it’s 
pretty much 20 grand a year …. that’s why a lot of doctors won’t do out of hours, it’s too 
expensive.’ (CS4/M60). 
86
Cost control also reduced the scope for provider diversity. Lower profit opportunities drove away 
some corporate providers. The social enterprise (CS23) reported that the CCG had found that many 
providers which might have tendered for its CHS contract found the work unaffordable. Tight NHS 
budgets also limited this social enterprise’s opportunities to collaborate with for-profit providers: 
‘when we talk to the private sector ... they come up with profit – it’s not good enough to have
a 10% profit. So that conversation soon stops and we talk to local Trusts and it’s a bit like 
you [the trust] just want to run the services. So that conversation soon stops as well and it’s 
a bit like tell us why, why would it improve the service?’ (CS23/M35). 
In two of our study LHEs, referral screening systems meant (CS9,25) that 
‘GPs can’t refer directly in to see an orthopaedic surgeon, they refer directly into what’s 
known as the MSK, musculoskeletal service, where there’s a big physio and MDT input’ 
(CS2/M19). 
This filtering device delayed patients’ access to secondary care generally, undermining the faster 
access to care which was traditionally corporate hospitals‘ main selling point in England.4,88  
6.a.ii.  Sustainability and Transformation Partnerships
STPs aimed to address the quality and financial sustainability of general practice, NHS workforce, 
workload and hospital infrastructure. Their purpose was to find ways to reconfigure services using 
the new models of care and meet the cost-reduction ‘challenges’ mentioned in Chapter 2. NHS and 
non-NHS providers seemed to have different opportunities to participate in this type of inter-
organisation planning. 
Most of the STPs for our study LHEs listed their collaborating organisations, which were primarily 
NHS acute, CHS, mental health and ambulance trusts, CCGs and local authorities, including health 
and well-being boards. They also listed the organisations falling within the STP footprint and/or 
involved in delivering the STP. Only one of the non-NHS organisations we studied (the corporate 
CHS (CS3)) was listed as a collaborator, and only one (the social enterprise CHS (CS23)) as falling 
within the STP footprint. The latter STP had included some other non-NHS providers in its footprint
but certainly not all since it omitted another of our study organisations (an NFP hospital (CS9)).
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It appeared that NHS organisations mostly saw STPs as matter for NHS, not non-NHS, providers. 
In LHE1 the STP catalysed joint working among the larger providers i.e. NHS Trusts, but had 
tended to focus only on them:
‘What we need to do is make sure that the treatment centre is included in part of that [STP], 
which is probably something that we haven’t done to date’ (CS1/C10).
Elsewhere, the voluntary hospital’s operations director made contact with its local STP 
‘but I think…the feedback I got was that they weren’t ready for us at this stage [laughs]’ 
(CS25/M53). 
One of the corporate hospitals (CS2) saw in the STP an emerging alliance between two of the acute 
trusts and the two CHS providers (also NHS trusts) but suggested that all providers were needed at 
the table. Managers from the corporate CHS were also engaged with STPs but found it 
‘really difficult going through a re-procurement process and [trying] to engage 
constructively in the STP’ (CS10/M39) 
since for STP purposes they had to sit around the table with competitors with whom they didn’t 
want to share ideas. The corporate OOH provider also found participation difficult, but more 
because there were several CCGs whose boundaries did not coincide with this provider’s catchment
area, which had different working practices, and seemed to desire both economies of scale and 
service localisation. However the recently ex-NHS social enterprises might be included: 
‘So [provider] are interesting because they can’t, because they’re a community interest 
company, they cannot be part of the financial arrangements but they are very much around 
the table with everything else. But in [area] you’ve got [corporation] running children’s 
service and they’re outside. And then what do you do with all the little providers?’ (CS13/).
If diverse providers’ responses to STPs differed, that was at least partly because NHS 
commissioners themselves treated them differently. Non-NHS providers were sometimes willing to 
contribute to the local STP but neither they nor NHS commissioners clearly foresaw yet what non-
NHS providers’ role, if any, was and the same applied to the proposed `accountable care’ 
organisations.
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6.b.  Quality and safety  
6.b.i.  Common standards
Common minimum service standards might be expected to make provider behaviour convergent, 
unless differently owned-providers attached different weights to these standards compared with 
other institutional logics.274 
Minimum standards for entering the NHS quasi-market tended to reduce divergence between 
providers’ service standards and reporting requirements. In order to join the extended choice 
network (c. 2007) the voluntary hospital had to 
‘get our computerised patient administration system to a level that it was acceptable to the 
NHS, so we could do choose and book’ (CS25/M50), 
which involved ISO 27001 (information security standard) certification and adopting the NHS 
information governance toolkit. This requirement applied to all hospitals. At the time of our 
fieldwork the new 2016/17 NHS Standard Contract was being introduced, but it was a framework 
contract that allowed some local discretion. One not-for-profit hospital (CS10) at least was re-
negotiating the detailed terms with its local CCG. The new contract was for two years not one. It 
stipulated indicative caseload volumes (reducing flexibility) but also decreased the time spent on 
contract development. 
Once a provider entered the NHS quasi-market, common standards also tend to reduce divergence 
by requiring certain common working practices irrespective of ownership. Together, informants at 
all our case studies confirmed that they were subject to at least the following standards, the exact 
selection varying by focal care group. 
 1. NICE guidelines e.g. on venous thromboembolism or pre-operative blood pressure. The 
case-study organisations, their parent organisations and sometimes also a cross-
organisational task group altered managers to relevant guidelines. This codification reduced 
differences between case-study organisations. We found no evidence of differential 
prioritisation or trade-offs against other priorities. The voluntary hospital (CS25) informants 
said that its clinical governance policies and procedures were constantly adapting according 
to ‘best practice’ and NICE guidelines. In the corporate CHS each business unit’s clinical 
lead (CS3/M43) ensured they adhered to NICE guidance. 
 2. Many managerial key performance indicators (KPI). Thus the social enterprise CHS (CS23) 
found itself having to generate demand for Improving Access to Pyschological Therapies 
(IAPT) service in order to meet the uptake targets for that nationally-prioritised service 
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development. The social enterprise (CS24) and co-operative (CS20) OOH providers had, 
like all others, to report their National Quality Requirements (NQR: ‘Carson standards’) 
performance on triage time and appropriateness, although the introduction of NHS111 had 
made some of these standards in need of re-interpretation, if not redundant. All providers of 
NHS-funded joint replacements sent outcome data to the National Joint Registry. The focus 
for clinical governance in the voluntary hospital (CS25) was quite closely prescribed as it 
followed the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) templates, which NHS acute trusts 
also followed. 
 3. Documentation of certain managerial decisions was required in non-NHS as in NHS 
hospitals. In a not-for-profit hospital 
‘I think we’ve got in to, from a regulatory point of view, now everything has to be down, 
documented or they say it’s never happened. So we’re in that mode of where, you know, 
we have our own board meeting and we document and agree exactly what we want to be
working on.’ (CS10/M29).
 4. CQC inspections reportedly played a significant part in governance for all providers. The 
OOH social enterprise (CS24) described CQC as its ‘main regulator’. CQC inspection 
methods for independent hospitals were still being finalised when we did our fieldwork. 
This had posed problems for our multi-site NFP provider (CS9) which, despite being 
involved in developing the guidance and inspection process, felt their inspection had been 
conducted within a framework that was still evolving. The same attention to the five key 
CQC questions was reported in both the for-profit (CS4) and not-for-profit (CS9) 
corporations. The largest NHS trust in this study (CS13) saw CQC inspections as 
burdensome and quite adversarial, and meant the Trust had thus often to respond to priorities
set externally rather than their own strategic plans. This was felt to reduce their autonomy 
(despite being a Foundation Trust). 
 5. Health and Safety Executive reviews. 
 6. QOF requirements partly applied to all OOH providers (case studies 4,8,16,24). 
 7. In the corporate OOH provider (CS4) doctors’ written work (referrals, prescribing) and calls 
were audited by clinical staff (based on Royal College of General Practitioners (RCGP) 
guidance) and the medical director and clinical leads checked whether the doctor’s response 
had been appropriate; 
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‘there are clear guidelines on what a competent medical consultation entails, and so it’s 
very specified’ (CS4/M60).
 Audits for the same purpose were also routine in the ex-proprietary, cooperative and social 
enterprise OOH services (case studies 8,20,24). 
A few outcomes standards were being applied to the not-for-profit and corporate providers as well 
as the NHS, above all PROMs, safety incident reporting, patient satisfaction data and the friends 
and family test. The national patient satisfaction standards were checked at all the OOH providers. 
6.b.ii.  Ownership-specific standards
Other policies and standards, however, applied differently to diverse providers: 
 1. The Safe Staffing requirements275 (introduced in the NHS response276 to the Francis277 report 
and requiring hospitals to publish staffing levels monthly) applied only to NHS providers. 
Both the corporate and the social enterprise CHS providers (case-studies 3,23) had however 
also implemented these requirements locally and voluntarily as good practice. 
 2. NHS Providers reported their reference costs and surplus or loss to NHS Digital, non-NHS 
providers report profit or loss to Companies House. Social enterprises were subject to: 
‘a community interest company regulator who’s very light touch and really I can’t 
imagine what you’d have to do to deserve their ire’ (CS23/M35). 
 3. Non-NHS providers, including social enterprises, were not accountable to NHS 
Improvement or NHSE. The NHS Mandate formally applied only to NHS-owned 
organisations: 
‘we have to cope with what primarily is a statutory driven [...] sector – and so a lot of 
things that people have, don’t apply to us [social enterprise]’ (CS15/M35). 
 4. Data returns from NHS providers went to NHSE and NHS Digital, although some NHS 
providers were sceptical of their value: 
‘NHSE give us all templates of what reports we should create [..] They’re not massively 
useful and the amount of reports and paperwork we create on a monthly basis is just 
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ridiculous and one of the things that we’re all very keen on is as we move to an 
integrated hub that we have integrated reports. Why do we have three quality reports or 
three performance reports?’ (CS16/M04). 
Corporate hospitals and the Voluntary Hospital (CS25) returned data to PHIN. The CMA 
had told non-NHS providers that greater information should be made available to patients; a 
regulatory intervention tending to produce convergence in this respect. 
 5. CQUINs targets were applied, and incentivised for NHS trusts. National CQUINS for our 
tracer services included: improving staff health and well-being; reducing the impact of 
serious infection; supporting pro-active and safe discharge, personalised care and support 
planning, ambulance conveyance and NHS111 referrals. Compliance earned up to 2.5% of 
contract value. For the NHS hospital trust:
‘A lot of our focus is largely trying to deliver the CQUINy bits, making sure we get paid 
properly for the performance’ (13/M44). 
Some of these national indicators were however barely applicable to some providers 
(typically smaller, non-NHS organisations). Instead the 2.5% was available for local 
CQUINs (https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/cquin-2017-19-
guidance.pdf). For the voluntary hospital, for instance, the quality CQUINs had been 
suspended because the requirements of the Default Tariff Roll-over (DTR) tariff made 
CQUINs difficult to achieve and ‘financially inexpedient’ in the independent sector. Our 
voluntary hospital informants saw CQUINs’ effect as minimal: 
‘one would think that CQUIN could have had a fantastic impact on outcomes, but I don’t
think they did really’ (CS25/M49) 
because (in their view) CQUIN was set as a lowest common denominator standard, not used 
to drive innovation. Those adopted by the corporate ISTCs were locally agreed and thus 
varied between LHEs. 
 6. NHS Providers were not liable for VAT on non-clinical services or corporation tax. 
Companies usually were, but some non-profit and voluntary providers registered as charities
were exempt from corporation tax. 
Some care standards were discretionary. The OOH social enterprise (CS24) for example had an 
additional suite of locally agreed KPIs, introduced with new contracts in 2013 and covering various 
measures concerning outcomes, referrals, unfilled shifts and frequent callers. Similarly, the ex-
92
proprietary provider had a suite of local KPIs, many about end-of-life care. They were hoping to 
extend these KPIs to include OOH services for children. As noted, the corporate and social 
enterprise CHS providers implemented the Safe Staffing requirements voluntarily. 
Standard-setting thus presented a mixed picture, but despite instances of discretionary and of 
systematically different constraints for NHS and non-NHS owned providers, the stronger tendency 
appeared to be towards convergence. 
6.c.  Commissioning environment: implications for provider responsiveness  
Chapter 9 reports how differently-owned providers responded to their NHS commissioners’ 
demands. Here we focus on what external configurations of NHS commissioners and non-NHS 
payers the case-study providers faced, which had implication for their bargaining power and (as 
Chapter 6 explains) their patterns of innovation. 
6.c.i.  Public commissioners
For our case-study organisations two main characteristics of their commissioning environment were
its heterogeneity and its instability. 
Both the corporate hospitals were ISTC s, hence served NHS patients only. They were now paid by 
NHS tariff. The local CCGs commissioned the ones that we studied, although some elsewhere had 
entered the NHS quasi-market through the Any Qualified Provider (AQP) scheme. Unlike many of 
the other ISTCs, including the other one in this study, the case-study 1 ISTC received few referrals 
via choose and book: one informant said less than 15%, another 5%. The OOH cooperative (CS20) 
obtained roughly equal income from members’ subscriptions and CCG contracts. Winter pressure 
monies supplemented that. 
The entry and exit of non-NHS providers made the commissioning environment somewhat unstable
and unpredictable for the remaining providers. When recently-entered providers (often corporate: 
see Chapter 5) relinquished an NHS contract, CCGs re-let these contracts requiring ad-hoc 
responses from the remaining providers (often NHS Trusts). Insofar as corporate providers, 
especially ISTCs (CS1,2) or the not-for-profit corporation (CS9) relied on providing a narrow range
of operations, they were especially at risk from changes to national tariffs and the appearance of 
lists of PLCVs. Against this, competitive tendering involved periodic risks of losing contracts. 
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Both the corporate hospitals (case-studies 1,2) and the voluntary hospital did some capacity-
relieving work for local NHS hospitals. At case-study 2 this had been done under the old contract by
means of a ‘partial pathway transfers’ but that had ceased and the CSU were pushing for a sub-
contract (which the NHS hospital trust (CS13) was resisting). In the voluntary hospital, its local 
NHS hospital trust referred NHS-funded patients to them, paid for that work at NHS tariff rates, 
then claimed the tariff payment from the relevant CCG(s). 
‘So they are the trust’s patients, the trust outsource them to us, we invoice the trust, the trust 
pays us. But they then will invoice the CCG for that.’ (CS25/M53). 
During the study period the introduction of the Better Care Funds introduced an element of joint 
commissioning between local authorities and CCGs. It was particularly mature in one of the cities 
in LHE A, where one of our NHS hospital trust informants attended Better Care Fund meetings as 
part of their responsibility for collaborative working. This was also an area where integrated 
commissioning existed more generally. None of this, however, had much impact on the corporate 
ISTC, suggesting again that they were rather marginal to NHS local health economy. It was 
however an income source for the ex-proprietary OOH provider (CS8) which was also undertaking 
much activity around the integration agenda. 
6.c.ii.  Private payers
To the extent that they depend on external financing, providers behave so as to meet their payers’ 
demands.278 Insofar as they all pursue the same sources of income, diverse providers’ behaviour 
towards commissioners might therefore be expect to converge. However a provider’s aims, hence 
its ownership, may instead lead it to prefer specific sources of income. Then, the more the balance 
of public and private income varies between providers under different ownership, the more 
divergent their behaviour will be. Among our hospital case-study organisations the balance between
public and private income did indeed differ. 
Both ISTCs (CS1,2) did all, and the voluntary hospital (CS25) did nearly all, their work for the 
NHS. At one not-for-profit hospital (CS9) orthopaedics and general surgery were the main 
components of its NHS-funded work. It had planned to obtain 21% of its income from the NHS., 
but when we did our fieldwork the actual proportion was about a third and it had recently been 
‘much greater than it is now’ (CS9/M26) 
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At that higher level it had sometimes proved difficult for consultants to get a bed for their private 
patients, which our informants said damaged the hospital’s reputation. At another hospital under the 
same ownership (CS10) about 20% of ophthalmic activity was NHS-funded, and even more 
orthopaedics was (no figure given). These were its two main areas of NHS work. To spread its risks 
in face of competition, the voluntary hospital (CS25) acquired a plastic surgery centre with entirely 
private patients. 
The NFP hospitals (as opposed to treatment centres) therefore depended much more on private 
payers than NHS income. Managers at both emphasised they were independent providers and the 
NHS tariff did not pay well: 
‘You know, at the end of the day we are a private provider, we do want to ensure that we’ve 
got our PMI and we’re capturing the bulk of the insured patients locally. We’ve also got a 
self-pay market that we want to ensure that we see growth there. So for us NHS is another, 
just as important, form of our activity, but we wouldn’t want to see the hospital taken over 
with NHS patients because the margin is so tight.’ (CS10/M29)
‘we’re not an NHS hospital, we offer it as an option and we have to be sensible with the fact
that we’ve got private patients here as well’ (CS9/M27). 
Possibly the hospital would offer less capacity to the NHS, for 
‘then there’s an opportunity to increase our private work which gives us a better margin, 
let’s be honest about this’ (CS9/M26). 
One not-for-profit hospital (CS9) also offered private patients only clinical (ophthalmic) services 
(cataracts, laser eye surgery, cysts etc.) which were no longer available at this hospital on the NHS, 
and an enhanced recovery pathway (at no extra cost) using the provider’s health gym. 
Differently owned providers therefore displayed divergent behaviour when differences in ownership
were reflected in a different balance between NHS and private payers. Where only NHS funding 
was available provider behaviour was more convergent. This finding suggests that the more a non-
NHS provider depends on NHS income, the more its behaviour will converge upon that of NHS 
trusts (‘public firms’); and that the more a public firm relies on private payers, the more its 
behaviour will converge on that of non-NHS providers; an implication relevant to some NHS trusts.
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6.d.  Co-opetition  
In a given locality the same providers would often simultaneously collaborate in some respects and 
compete in others; so-called ‘co-opetition’.279 The Social Enterprise CHS (CS23) for example saw 
the voluntary sector as affording both possible competitors and partners. GPs were also seen to be 
emerging as potential competitors as well as collaborators. Some NHS informants interpreted (or 
misinterpreted) the Five Year Forward View as implying a shift towards 'cooperation' and 
'collaboration' and away from provider 'competition', equating the latter with more diverse 
ownership. Many however also perceived NHS Improvement (formerly Monitor) as taking a more 
pro-competitive view. 
6.d.i.  Provider competition
Our secondary care case-study organisations mainly competed in the patient choice part of the NHS
quasi-market. Through tendering, the CHS and OOH providers competed for markets. 
The NHS trust hospital (CS13) managers suggested that they were seen by some competitors as 
‘being fairly, you know, cut throat, carnivorous, if you like, wanting to grab everything to 
ourselves here’ (CSI13/M45). 
They said this competitive culture was present at both commissioning (contracting) and clinical 
level, and in regard to private practice. In that city, we were told, all the local NHS hospital trusts, 
BMI, Care UK, Circle, Ramsey and Virgin had all bid when the planned orthopaedics work was re-
tendered. In another city, the not-for-profit hospital (CS10) told us that the competitors for their 
work were independent providers such as BMI, Nuffield, Spire, and Ramsey
 ‘And the NHS actually, we usually find that the NHS usually win the tenders’ (CS10/M29). 
The voluntary hospital (CS25) said that a bid for MSK contracts was 
‘the one and only time we’ve entered into anything jointly [with the local NHST]’ 
(CS25/M50).
Previously they had sought orthopaedic work through the Any Willing Provider scheme. Local 
private hospitals such as Spire and Nuffield were considered competitors to a degree, and 
‘yeah we keep an eye on well is the NHS Trust sending NHS patients more there than they’re
sending here under 18 weeks’ (CS25/M50). 
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Whilst both the NHS Trust (CS15) and the social enterprise CHS (CS23) thought that no local 
competitors could completely replace them (see below), matters were different for particular 
component services of theirs. The NHS Trust (CS15) knew that nearby ISTCs provided hospital-at-
home services for surgical patients. Informants at the social enterprise CHS (CS23) saw scope for 
competition for specific pathways such as frail elder care, minor injury units or urgent care. The 
main potential competitors were two neighbouring NHS mental health trusts, the NHS hospital for 
some care pathways (e.g. acute stroke care, stroke rehabilitation) and a corporation for children’s 
services. The corporate CHS (CS3) saw nearby NHS providers as its competitors:
’all of the acutes, for example, our neighbouring community providers, bordering 
community providers, any number, any number’(CS3/M39). 
Even the voluntary sector were seen as potential competitors insofar as their care coordinator role at
the emergent integrated care hub might lead them to find substitutes for clinicians (CS3/M40). 
Both the ex-proprietary (CS8) and social enterprise (CS24) OOH providers saw corporations as 
their main competitors, competing largely on price. One corporation had won a tender by bidding 
£7.87 per call as against £7.90 for an allegedly higher quality service, but 
‘a lot of those organisations have withdrawn from the market now because there’s not a 
profit to be made’ (CS24/M01). 
For some of the case-study organisations, both prospective competition and longer-standing local 
rivalries inhibited collaboration. Social enterprise CHS (CS23) informants perceived a risk that that 
other providers would suggest mental health services and probably children’s services should be 
contracted to a specialist provider, a risk inhibiting collaboration. The OOH co-operative (CS20) 
was about to relinquish a contract for OOH services to a ‘private competitor’ (partly owned by GP 
members of the cooperative) because: 
‘we use that exact word, [Town’s] GP practices are subsiding [Firm] and they won’t like it if
we announce that to them, which we haven’t done. But we have a meeting with them on 
Monday, to see the CCG.’ (CS20/M56). 
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6.d.ii.  Collaborating providers
For some case-study organisations, provider competition was practically absent. Moreover they 
often positively collaborated with other providers, whether by establishing a division of labour 
between them, by one subcontracting the other, or in less formal ‘relational’ ways. 
The CHS trust (CS15) had not had to tender to one CCG for a long while, and another CCG had 
expressly decided not to seek tenders 
‘because they do not believe it adds significant value’ (CS15/M23)
By implication, the CCG did not think any gains were worth the transaction costs. They only let 
competitive tenders if providers were unable or unwilling to negotiate satisfactory arrangements 
with them. Both the physical and mental health contracts with the social enterprise CHS (CS23) had
gone to tender rather than the preferred provider route. One respondent commented on the fact that 
CCG staff made threats such as 
‘that service, we may put that out to tender, unless performance improves’ 
but this view was largely attributed to unhelpful individuals rather than the CCG officially. 
‘We’re sensible enough to think well if there’s someone better to provide it then why are we 
doing it?’ (CS23/M35) 
and 
‘there are very few people able to compete with us because of the scope of what we do and 
how embedded we are locally, and with our social care colleagues’ (CS23/M34). 
The social enterprise CHS (CS23) was trying to link their services (e.g. contraceptive and sexual 
health services) with those (respectively, genito-urinary medicine) in the NHS hospital trust, which 
meant entering 
‘any sort of competitive tender together’ (CS23/M33). 
NHS Trust OOH service (CS16) informants felt they had few if any local competitors 
‘because we’re embedded because we have 111 and out of hours and the single point of 
access, I think it would be perceived as quite difficult to move us off’ (CS16/M04). 
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The OOH Co-operative (CS20) thought they were 
‘in a much safer position than other out of hours organisations because we’re actually 
owned by our member practices’ (CS20/M56), 
which removed the need to tender to a CCG every three or five years. The NHS trust’s OOH service
(CS16) had not been re-tendered since 2004 with KPIs and other matters being re-negotiated 
annually, although recently the CCG made a contract variation to synchronise the NHS111 and 
OOH contracts so that both services could go out to one tender. 
One study LHE (a city) lacked private hospital competition. The two private hospitals nearest to one
of the not-for-profit hospitals (CS9) were over 50km away, and one of them belonged to the same 
organisation. The local NHS hospital had closed its private patient unit. Voluntary hospital (CS25) 
informants explained that for MSKP and the orthopaedic services 
‘they [NHS trust] can do certain things that we can’t necessarily’ (CS25/M53:161), 
Therefore, 
‘We’re not aggressive with each other, we’re not actively you know, poaching each other’s 
customers in effect and in fact at times it’s the complete opposite. If a local trust is 
struggling to meet their 18 week target then they will contract with us to help them deliver it
and so on those kind of things that is a collaborative arrangement’ (CS25/M50). 
Both corporate ISTCs had minor illness units which helped support their respective NHS hospitals 
trusts’ A&E departments. Informants at that NHS trust (CS13) recognised but downplayed the 
contribution: 
‘Early days I think it was very fraught, now I think it, sort of, works. If we take a trust view, I
think, or more of a clinical trust view, is that they do all the simple stuff, all the difficult gets 
deferred to us and we’re still the dumping ground, which I think is true. And [I] think their 
threshold for more complex is fairly low’ (CS13/M45). 
Their local ISTC (CS2) broadly endorsed this; it focused on providing ‘bread and butter elective 
care’ for relatively fit and well people. Consequently, 
‘I [corporate hospital manager] don’t feel competitive in nature towards any of the other 
providers locally. I think we’re providing a slightly different service’ (CS2/M19). 
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As reported above, non-NHS providers were sometimes subcontracted to NHS Trusts and vice-
versa, removing competition between them those services. At CS2 a remaining tension with the 
NHS trust was over how tariffs were decided and paid between them rather than about who 
provided what treatments, with the corporate hospital informants feeling that the NHS Trust should 
be rewarded for the complexity of its surgery. A GP-owned company had previously provided OOH
services for most of the county where our social enterprise OOH provider (CS4) subsequently 
operated, but the GP-owned firm had done so by subcontracting the work to a large corporation. 
The latter then withdrew, reportedly 
‘on the basis you couldn’t make a profit, or a big enough profit’ (CS24/M01). 
The same corporation had also provided NHS111 services under sub-contract both to an NHS Trust,
and OOH services to care homes under sub-contract to another corporation. According to its annual 
report the Social Enterprise OOH service (CS  24  ) had also had until 2013 a 
‘long and successful sub-contracting relationship’ 
with an NHS ambulance trust for call-handling services. 
As for positive collaboration, not just non-competition, the CHS trust (CS15) was collaborating 
with a bordering corporate CHS provider whose treatment centre (for diagnostics services) was not 
being fully utilised, and still more with voluntary providers (Community Voluntary Services, 
Voluntary Action Group, Community First). A number of private partners from consulting firms, 
information and IT providers, and ‘private’ healthcare providers had also approached them to 
collaborate regarding the STP.  Both the not-for-profit (CS9) and the corporate (CS1,2) hospitals 
saw themselves as taking pressure off the local NHS trust. These collaborations were at times 
informal, ad hoc and practical: 
‘You have to be able to ring them [corporate provider] up and say, “Actually, the radiology 
system has gone off, and we’re desperate and you’ve got to do something.” And they’re 
going to go, “We’ll going to get out of bed and we’re going to sort it for you”’ (CS13/M46).
These relationships extended to pharmaceutical companies and a private company running the 
hospital at home service: 
100
‘And actually it took us [NHS hospital] a while, I think, to realise, it took me a while (…), 
that actually even the people who ran those private sector services were good people. They 
were normally ex-NHS people who wanted to do partnership and integration.’ (CS13/M46). 
Although this NHS trust’s (CS13) local environment was described as fraught by ‘history’ and 
‘politics’ it still collaborated with another NHS hospital trust to provide a more stable service, and 
with the community trust (CS15) to support, for example, the frail elderly pathway. 
The voluntary hospital also saw its not-for-profit charitable status as promoting a symbiotic 
relationship with local NHS trusts. The Corporate CHS (CS3) took a similar view for slightly 
different reasons, offering spare capacity to a nearby NHS hospital to alleviate escalating pressures 
there because 
‘it’s about doing the right thing, it’s about being a good citizen within the health economy, 
doing the right thing for patients, but it’s also about reputation and being seen as an 
organisation that can do. Because that will always help us win the contract back’ 
(CS3/M39).
The voluntary hospital (CS25) knew that many NHS hospitals were struggling with their elective 
orthopaedics, which limited scope to train junior doctors, and so the voluntary provider offered to 
provide this training opportunity, which would also increase their operating theatre efficiency. 
‘So from that perspective I see them as partners because, you know, we have to support each
other to be able to deliver the service across the economy’ (CS25/M53). 
6.e.  Diverse providers and their environments  
Stringent restrictions on NHS budgets tended to encourage broadly convergent behaviour regarding 
innovation. They also tended to limit ownership diversification among providers of NHS-funded 
services, especially the expansion of corporate provision. Insofar as safety, quality and reporting 
standards were common across diversely-owned providers they tended to produce convergent 
behaviour but this effect was mitigated insofar as not all standards were the same for diverse 
providers. Other conditions tending to produce convergent behaviour were the scale and 
composition of care groups for competitively tendered services (OOH, CHS). 
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Case-mix differences tended to produce divergent service development between NHS trusts and 
other hospitals, their selections of services and care groups reflecting the providers’ aims and 
therefore ownership. To a limited extent, the emergence of STPs seemed to at least initially to 
expose (not ‘cause’) divergences between providers within and without the ‘NHS family’. These 
differences reflected provider histories of inexperience at participation in NHS-style planning at 
health economy level, but that may in turn reflect different ownership insofar as such participation 
is barely relevant to the aims of the owners of corporations. Providers which relied on both 
privately- and NHS-funded patients diverged in behaviour from those which, irrespective of 
ownership, relied solely on NHS-funded payment because the former needed to preserve their 
income from, and therefore differentiate, their services for privately-funded patients. 
That two providers operated in the same place did not necessarily mean that they faced the same 
environment in terms of case mix, care group size, substitute or competing providers. Providers 
were not just constrained by their environment, in particular their competitive environment, but also
tried to re-shape it. This brings us to our findings about how these environment conditions related to
diverse providers’ organisational structures and work processes. 
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Chapter 7.  Diverse structures 
• Differently-owned providers had different top-level organisational structures and 
accountability chains. 
• At workplace level the structures for coordinating everyday work were essentially similar 
(bureaucratic hierarchy) irrespective of ownership. 
• A partial exception was that in doctor-owned organisations, the doctors self-organised their 
work in more-or-less democratic ways. 
• Marketing was more developed in non-NHS providers. 
Next we report how organisational structures differed by ownership. Because the same corporation 
owned case-study providers 1,2 and 4 we have combined our data about them to describe a single 
organisational structure. This also applies to case-study hospitals 9 and 10, both owned by the same 
not-for-profit organisation. In the event we found few structural differences between the 
ophthalmology and orthopaedics hospital services when they were in the same hospital, so we have 
also grouped our data about them together. 
7.a.  Ownership and aims  
All the case-study organisations irrespective of ownership had a set of broad aims stating how their 
activity benefited patients and their staff. Additionally they had more specific objectives, stated by a
variety of sources: by managers themselves, in managerial documents (e.g. annual reports), on 
websites and in other publicity materials. Where the case-study organisations differed by type of 
ownership was in what objectives they had, what these objectives covered, and the balance of 
emphasis between objectives. 
7.a.i.  Common aims
No healthcare provider is likely to deny that they aim to provide the best possible care for their 
patients. Every study organisation had somewhat rhetorical strategic ‘mission’ or ‘vision’ 
statements. The formulations differed slightly by focal service but were nevertheless similar 
irrespective of ownership. High quality, patient-focused care was one: 
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‘Everything we do is about putting people first - whether that be delivering exceptional care
and support for our clients, or providing growth and development opportunities for our 
teams’ (corporate website, CS4) 
The OOH social enterprise aimed to 
‘provide high quality, patient-focused service for the patients’ (CS24) . 
NHS hospital trust informants said for example that it aimed to
‘work with our partners at the leading edge of healthcare’ (CS13). 
The ‘partners’ explicitly included patients. Besides helping maintain patient independence, the CHS
trust stated it aimed to 
‘play a lead role in the development of an integrated health and social care system in 
[county]’(CS15). 
Its detailed aims, as outlined in its Annual Plan, included the delivery of: 
1. Safe Services
2. Improved clinical outcomes
3. Improved patient experience
Another permutation was for ‘people to stay safe, well and at home’, this example reflecting 
national imperatives in the ‘vision’ of the CHS social enterprise (CS23). The free-standing 
voluntary hospital had aims based on: 
‘clinical outcomes, our clinical experience and clinical excellence; patient advocacy, 
because patients like us and they want to come back.…. So those are three pillars, if you 
like’ (CS25/M53).
and the not-for-profit chain was (an informant said): 
‘a very, very people based organisation and it wants to do the right thing in the right way … 
it’s patient first, which is, yeah, things like the health MOT, the health recovery plus stuff is 
all added value bits because we care about the patient.’ (CS9/M32). 
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7.a.ii.  Ownership-related objectives
What differed was what further objectives were stated and where the emphasis lay. Evidence about 
the latter includes the patterns of ‘tight-loose’ control133, that is which aspects of managerial 
performance were closely monitored, heavily incentivised and preoccupied managers in practice; 
and what was left to local discretion. 
The corporation owning case-study organisations 1,2 and 4 described itself as a major international 
private equity group focused on investing in market-leading businesses, to realise ‘value’ in its 
portfolio companies. Each hospital director had a monthly business review by telephone with her 
line manager, covering: 
‘quality, patient outcomes, patient experience, so you get the usual stuff around complaints 
and VTE, audits and all stuff, and watching outcomes on your orthopaedic, result scores on 
the national grids, and all of that stuff comes into it. And of course the numbers comes into 
it as well.’ (CS2/M18) 
 ‘It’s very well policed, I can assure you’ (CS1/M06). 
A hospital operations manager suggested that as long as financial targets were met there 
‘was quite a lot of autonomy on sites to make investment’ (CS1/M07). 
During re-tendering the finances were reviewed centrally to ensure the ISTC returned a profit, with 
a risk assessment in advance. In the corporate OOH services the service manager had set the budget 
himself with approval from the central finance team but also 
‘we have shareholders and we need to make a profit, our service is scrutinised’ (CS4/M58) 
There was no critical threshold and he had never been criticised for overspending provided it could 
be justified by patient care and appropriate staff deployment. 
In the corporate CHS, its ex-NHS managers and staff described budget management as being more 
rigorous than in the NHS. The Head of Intermediate Care and Community Hospitals was 
accountable for delivering the required services within budget. The corporation had a clinical 
governance scorecard which went to the board (reporting for example infection control, serious 
incidents, safety and supervision). There was also a finance dashboard for each business unit.
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‘So I know I’m paying my staff, I’m buying equipment, I’m paying, you know, even down to 
my water coolers, you know, I’m maintaining and servicing my hoists and paying my 
estates, and everything is coming out of my budget. So I see the whole picture, if that makes 
sense’ (CS3/M43). 
Thus 
‘they are obsessed with budgets. They are obsessed with targets. And to be fair, they’re also 
obsessed with client satisfaction’ (CS3/M43). 
Community hospital inpatient care was not expected to come in under budget but if surpluses were 
generated elsewhere they were to be reinvested in the service. 
Since its proprietary days the objectives of the ex-proprietary OOH provider expressly included 
financial growth. Then, it had tried to win more contracts partly as a 
‘potentially commercial opportunity … but also the ability to step outside, in those days, 
some of the red tape associated with the NHS’ (CS8/M09). 
They therefore diversified into telehealth and acquired a housing association careline. They also bid
jointly, although unsuccessfully, with other companies and NHS trusts for additional service 
contracts. These expansionary efforts attracted an offer of buy-out from an American finance 
company. An informant thought that 
‘for a commercial organisation, we are not financially driven’ (CS8/M10) 
but was more sceptical about other ‘independent’ providers: 
‘having worked in the independent sector a lot say they are [patient-focussed], but in the 
basements of their buildings ... conversations I’ve had could lead you to conclude 
differently’(CS8/M10).
Being state-owned, NHS trusts’ (CS13,15,16) overall objectives derived of course from the health 
policies outlined in Chapter 2. Accountability for pursuing them carried through to senior and 
middle managers there, with a high degree of central control, above all through commissioners (see 
Chapter 9). Far from financial expansion, the NHS trusts had objectives for financial contraction. 
Reducing spending was a – if not the – major, clearly-incentivised objective, especially in the 
hospital trust which faced a £33 million ‘Cost Improvement Programme’: 
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‘there’s clearly a very big drive, and I understand it, on saving money in terms of coming 
through next year to break even, to get the extra cash that you need from the government. 
You know, there’s obviously the CQC priorities, and the front door work really, the capacity 
challenges, you’re constantly on black and red alert, and the four hour waits and the 
[winter] pressures’ (CS13/M47). 
The hospital trust’s objective was minimising losses rather than making a surplus (in any event 
unrealistic for most services in the circumstances): 
‘I’m not too concerned about profit necessarily […] But as long as the organisation doesn’t 
lose money, and we’re providing a better service or an improved service, then that’s got to 
be what we try and aim at’ (CS13/M045). 
For the NHS trust providing OOH services, the most recent financial reports (2014/15) showed an 
operating surplus of £0.2 million, less than projected. The CHS Trust (CS15) had to remedy the 
previous year’s overspend of about £1.9 million. After the three quoted above, the remaining two 
aims in its Strategic Plan were: 
4. Improve value for money, reduce costs
5. Establish new service models for sustainable health and social care
Its income had already been reduced by 10% over five years, but since demand for its services were
meantime rising it still faced severe cost control pressures. Re-designing of services here had one 
extreme implication. Interviewees there expected the CHS Trust not to continue in its current 
‘monolithic’ mode but to move towards: 
‘a sort of network of arm’s length business units that sit within a wider structure’ 
(CS15/M23)
‘our organisation won’t exist, and our board is absolutely clear [FT name] will not exist in a
two to three year timescale because there will be a new entity that delivers an integrated 
primary care offer’ (CS15/M25). 
Self-dismemberment was quite opposite to the non-NHS case-study organisations’ objectives. 
The not-for-profit hospital chain (CS9,10) was owned by its membership (company limited by 
guarantee, maximum liability £1 per member). Annual General Meetings of members elected the 
Board, whilst the Board decided who may become a member. Its aims were to promote and provide 
